

NIETZSCHE: NOTES FOR “WE PHILOLOGISTS”

Translated by William Arrowsmith

Among the *nachgelassene Fragmente* of Nietzsche are a group of eight notebooks from the period January-July, 1875. Thanks to the labors of Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari in the Nietzsche archives, these fragments are at last available in the complete German text (*Nietzsche: Werke. Kritische Gesamtausgabe*, Vol. 4, fasc. 1. De Gruyter, Berlin). The text provides us with the notes and jottings from which Nietzsche intended to write a critical study of his own profession under the title *Wir Philologen*. This projected book was meant to form part of a larger opus called *Unzeitgemässe Betrachtungen* (whose completed fascicles include *David Strauss, Vom Nutzen und Nachteil der Historie, Schopenhauer als Erzieher* and *Wagner in Bayreuth*) devoted to the revitalization of German culture on the basis of a new *trivium* consisting of Schopenhauer, Wagner, and a *reformed* classical philology. Until the text of Colli and Montinari appeared, the only available text was the inaccurate and incomplete version compiled by Nietzsche's sister. The translation published here is the first *complete* translation of Nietzsche's notes for *Wir Philologen*.

The word “notes” should be stressed. These fragments are not finished aphorisms but jottings, insights, memoranda, and quotations, in various stages of completion; they have no coherent order and contain, as one would expect, both inconsistencies and repetitions as well as insights which would have been refined or discarded in the actual process of writing.

—Trans.

[2 == U II 8a. To the beginning of March, 1875.]

2[1] The conch is curved inside, rough on the outside. When blown, it has a booming bass; then, for the first

time, it wins the respect it deserves. (*Ind. Sprüche*, ed. Böthlingk, I, 335)

An ugly-looking wind-instrument: it must first be blown.

2[2]

Themes

Theory of the ridiculous. Collected examples.

Theory of the horrible. With collected examples.

Description of my musical experience with regard to Wagner.

The question in music.

A large notebook to be set up for daily ideas, experiences, projects, etc.—in which scholarly insights can be briefly entered. To put all literary projects aside. *Mihi scribere*.

2[3]

We Philologists

Tentative Outline

1. Origin of the contemporary philologue.
2. The contemporary philologue and the Greeks.
3. Consequences for non-philologues.
4. Glances at the Greeks.
5. The future education of the philologist.
6. Greeks and Romans—and Christianity. Wolf's dissociation.

Better:

- a. The preference for the Greeks.
- b. Origin of the contemporary philologue.
- c. Their effect on non-philologists.
- d. Their position on the true Greeks.
- e. Future matters.

2[4] Perhaps cite against the enemies of antiquity Cicero's remark (*In Pison*. 30): *Quid te, asine, litteras doceam? Non opus est verbis, sed fustibus*.

2[5] There remains a great deal of *doubt* whether inferences can be drawn from *language* to nationality and the *relationship* with other *nations*. A victorious language is often (not always) merely a sign of successful conquest. Where have there ever been autochthonous peoples? To talk about Greeks who have never lived in Greece is a wholly foggy notion. What is peculiarly Greek is not so much the result of native disposition as of adapted institutions, and also an adopted language.

2[6] I want to make brief catechisms for my students, e.g.,

—on reading and writing.

—on Greek literature.

—the chief characteristics of the Greeks.

Greeks and Romans.

What can be learned from the Greeks.

2[7] a. Predilection for the ancient world, its motives and their refutation.

b. Formation of the philologist up to the present day; also his clients.

2[8] *Klinger* says: "Civilization is a product of free and courageous feelings."

[3 == MP XXXX 6b. (U II 8, 239-200). March, 1875.]

3[1] Go and conceal your good works,
and confess before the people
the sins you have committed.
—Buddha

3[2] The eighth of April, 1777, when F. A. Wolf invented for himself the name of *stud. philol.*, is the birthday of philology.

1.

3[3] There would be nothing to say against the science of philology, if the philologists were not also the educators. This is the problem; this is why even philology is subject to a higher tribunal.—And would philology still exist, if philologists were not professional teachers?

3[4] It is hard to justify the *preference* accorded to the classics, since it rests upon prejudices:

1. On ignorance of non-classical antiquity.
2. On a false idealization of humane values in general—whereas Indians and Chinese are more humane anyway.
3. On the arrogance of schoolmasters.
4. On the traditional admiration—which began with the Romans.
5. On opposition to, or support of, the Christian church.
6. On the impression left by long centuries of work by philologists, and by the nature of their work. The classics must really be a gold-mine, thinks the spectator.
7. On skills and knowledge acquired from antiquity. A preparatory school for scientific scholarship.

In sum: partly on *ignorance*, mistaken judgements, and *sophistic conclusions*, in part through *the professional self-interest* of the philologists.

Preference later accorded to the classics by the artists, who instinctively assumed that the sense of measure and *sophrosyne* were the property of the entire classical period. Pure form. The same thing happened with the writers too.

Preference for the classics as an abbreviated history of mankind—as though they were some autochthonous creation in which all Becoming could be studied.

Actually *the reasons for this preference* are now grad-

ually *disappearing*, and if the fact has not been noticed by philologists, it has been noted with maximum clarity outside their circle. The study of history has had its effect; then linguistics caused an enormous defection—and even desertion—among the philologists. Now all they have left is the schools; but for how long? In the form in which it has existed *until now*, classical philology is *dying out*: the ground has vanished from under it. Whether philologists will survive *as a profession* is extremely doubtful; in any case they are a dying race.

3[5] Our *terminology* clearly shows how prone we are to misunderstand the ancients. For example, the exaggerated taste for *literature*; or the case of Wolf who, when speaking of the “inner history of classical erudition,” calls it “the history of *learned enlightenment*.”

3[6] What mockery of the *Humanities* that they are also called “belles lettres” (*bellas litteras*)!

3[7] Wolf's reasons why the Egyptians, Hebrews, Persians, and other Oriental peoples cannot be put on a level with the Greeks and Romans: “The former peoples have either not raised themselves at all, or only a few rungs, above that level of culture which ought to be called *civil polity* or *civil government*, as opposed to the *true higher spiritual culture*.” He then explains that this culture is intellectual and *literary*: “In a successfully organized people, this can commence before peace and order in external life (‘civilization’).” He next contrasts the easternmost inhabitants of Asia (“resembling such individuals as want for nothing in the cleanliness, decorum, and comfort of their dwellings, clothing, and entire environment, but who never feel the lack of a higher enlightenment”) with the *Greeks* (“among the Greeks, even among the most educated people of Attica, the opposite often occurs to a remarkable degree, and they neglected

as unimportant what we, thanks to our love of order, have come to regard as the basis of spiritual refinement").

3[8] "At the close of his life Markland, like so many of his peers before him, felt such a repugnance for all scholarly fame, that he destroyed several works on which he had long been engaged, tearing some up and burning others."

3[9] "In the period of Winckelmann's youth, philological studies as such did not exist, apart from the common service of professional disciplines—in those days men read and explained the ancients in order to prepare themselves better for interpreting the Bible and the *Corpus Iuris*."

3[10] Friedrich August Wolf recalls how cautious and feeble were the first steps taken by our predecessors in shaping scholarship once—how even the Latin classics had to be smuggled into the university market, as though contraband. In a Göttingen book-catalogue of 1737, J. M. Gesner advertises a copy of the Odes of Horace: "ut imprimis, quid prodesse in *severioribus studiis* possint, ostendat."

3[11] Newton was astonished that men like Bentley and Hare (because they were both theological worthies) should come to blows over a volume of ancient comedies.

3[12] It is so difficult to find close rapport with something classical; you must know how to wait until you manage to hear something. The *human element* which the classics reveal to us should not be confused with the *humane*. The opposition should be strongly emphasized. What ails philology is that it tries to intrude the humane;

this is the sole reason why the young are introduced to the classics, to be humanized. In my opinion a good deal of history is enough to achieve that end. Brutality and arrogance are cut down when men observe how things and values change.—The humanity of the Greeks lies in a certain naïveté in which, among them, man is revealed—his state, art, society, military and civil law, sexual relations, education, politics. It is precisely the human element which is visible at any time among all peoples, but among the Greeks, in a state of nakedness and inhumanity which makes it indispensable for education. The Greeks, moreover, have created the greatest number of individuals—and it is in this respect that they are so instructive about *man*: a Greek cook is more of a cook than any other.

3[13] Christianity has overcome the classical world—that is easily said. First, Christianity is itself a part of antiquity; second, it has preserved the classical world; third, it has never competed against the pure classical period at all. Rather: Christianity, in order to survive, had to allow itself to be conquered by the spirit of antiquity, for example, the idea of *imperium*, the community, etc. We suffer from the extreme impurity and obscurity of *human affairs*, from the clever *mendacity* which Christianity has brought among men.

3[14] Greek antiquity has not yet been evaluated as a whole. I am convinced that, if it were not wrapped in the radiance of tradition, modern men would reject it with horror. The radiance, that is, is spurious, a gilding.

3[15] A philologist has a great advantage: so much of the preliminary work in his discipline has been done that he can, if he has the *talent*, claim possession of his heritage—that is, to undertake the *evaluation* of the whole Hellenic mind. So long as scholarship pattered at details,

misunderstanding of the Greeks was the result. *Stages in this misunderstanding* to be noted: Sophists of the second century, the scholar-poets of the Renaissance, the classicist as teacher of the upper classes (Goethe, Schiller).

3[16] *Imitation* of antiquity: in point of fact, hasn't this principle been refuted?

Escape from reality to the classics: hasn't the understanding of antiquity already been falsified in this way?

3[17] One kind of consideration is left: to *understand* how the greatest creations of spirit have a background of evil and terror. The *sceptical* consideration: to examine Hellenism as the most beautiful example of life.

Correct judgment is hard.

3[18] It is not true that culture can *only* be acquired from the classics. But some culture *can* be got from them. Not, of course, what is called "culture" now. Our culture is built solely on an utterly castrated and mendacious study of the classical world.

To see how futile this study is, one has only to look at our classicists. Yet they *most of all* should be *educated by the classics*.

2.

3[19] How much men are ruled by chance, and how little by reason, is shown by the almost regular disparity between what is called a vocation and the obvious cases of mistaken vocation. Successful cases, like successful marriages, are exceptions, and even these are not the result of reason. A man *chooses* his career at an age when he is not fit to choose; he doesn't know the various

professions; he doesn't know himself; and then he wastes his most active years in this career, giving his whole mind to it, acquiring experience. His judgment reaches its peak; and by then it is usually too late to begin something new. And earthly wisdom is almost always linked with the weakness of old age and lack of physical strength.

The task is largely that of repairing, of correcting as far as possible, what was bungled at the beginning. Many will recognize that their later life shows a sense of purpose which sprang from an original disharmony. It makes living hard. But at the end of life a man has become used to it—then he can deceive himself about his life and praise his own stupidity: *bene navigavi cum naufragium feci*. And he may even sing a hymn of praise to "Providence."

3[20] I ask then about the development of the classicist, and I maintain:

1. A young man cannot possibly know who the Greeks and the Romans are.
2. He doesn't know whether he is fit to study the classics.
3. And, above all, he has no idea to what extent this knowledge qualifies him to be a *teacher*. The decisive factor, then, is not knowledge of himself and his discipline, but:
 - a) Imitation,
 - b) Laziness, since he goes on doing the sort of work he used to do in school,
 - c) Eventually, also, his aim of earning a living.

I believe: ninety-nine classicists out of a hundred *should not* be in the profession.

3[21] The stricter religions require that man view his activity solely as a means in a metaphysical plan: a failure in the choice of vocation can then be viewed as a test of the individual. Religions are solely concerned

with the individual's salvation; whether he is slave or free, merchant or scholar, his life's goal does not lie in his profession. And therefore a wrong choice is no disaster. This may comfort philologists. But for true philologists, the judgment is plain: what can be expected from a discipline practised by ninety-nine such men? This truly unqualified majority legislates the rules of the discipline and makes its demands according to the abilities and inclinations of the majority. By so doing, it *tyrannizes* the hundredth, the only competent man in the lot. If it controls education, it *educates*, consciously or unconsciously, in *its own* image. What happens then to the *classical quality* of the Greeks and Romans?

To be demonstrated:

- A) The disparity between the classicists and the classics.
- B) The unfitness of the classicist to *educate* with the aid of the classics.
- C) *The perversion of the discipline by the (unfitness of the) majorities; false claims; denial of the true goals of this discipline.*

3[22] In what way does a man become *best fitted* for this evaluation?—In any case, certainly not when he is trained in philology as he is at present. Discuss: to what degree methods make this last goal impossible.—That is, the philologist himself is *not* the aim of philology.—

3[23] *Leopardi* is the modern ideal of a philologist. The German philologists cannot *create* anything. (Voss is a fine example!)

3[24] *Vanity* is the unconscious tendency to pose as an individual when one is not; to pose, that is, as independent when one is dependent. Wisdom is the opposite: appearing to be dependent when you are independent.

3[25] One great value of the ancient world is that its writings are the only ones which modern men still *read carefully*.

3[26] *Overstraining of memory*—very common among philologists; underdeveloped judgment.

3[27] In the education of the modern classicist the influence of linguistics should be noted and assessed. Preferably a classicist should avoid it. Questions of the prehistoric origins of Greeks and Romans should be no concern of his. How can people spoil their subject in this way?

3[28] I notice in classicists:

1. Lack of respect for the ancient world.
2. Effeminate and flowery style; perhaps a note of apology.
3. Historical simplification.
4. Self-importance.
5. Underrating of gifted classicists.

3[29] Bergk's *Literaturgeschichte*: not a spark of Greek fire and Greek *sense*!

3[30] I enjoy reading Bentley's remark: *non tam grande pretium emendatiunculis meis statuere soleo, ut singularem aliquam gratiam inde sperem aut exigam*.

3[31] Horace was summoned by Bentley before a tribunal which Horace would certainly have repudiated. The admiration which a discerning man acquires as a philologist is proportionate to the scarcity of intellectual acuteness among philologists.—Bentley's brief against

Horace has something schoolmasterish about it, except that the target is not Horace, but the transmitters of Horace. In reality and generally, however, Horace is the accused. I am firmly convinced that to have written a single line worthy of comment by scholars of a later age outweighs the merit of the greatest textual critic. The philologist's role is profoundly modest. The improvement of texts is an amusing task for scholars, like solving riddles; but it should not be viewed as an important matter. It would be a pity if the classics should speak to us less clearly because a million words stood in the way!

3[32] A schoolmaster said to Bentley: "Sir, I shall make your grandson as great a scholar as you." "How can you do that," replied Bentley, "when I have forgotten more than you ever knew?"

3[33] Wolf says that Bentley, both as a human being and as a man of letters, was misunderstood and persecuted, or even maliciously praised, for most of his life.

3[34] For Wolf the peak of historical research is to rise to a large and comprehensive view of the whole and a serious grasp of the differences in artistic advances and the various styles. But Wolf admits that Winckelmann lacked, or failed to apply, that more common talent, which is textual criticism: "a rare blend of cool intelligence and a petty, nervous concern for a hundred irrelevant matters, combined with a fire that quickens everything and devours particulars, and an intuitive gift which offends the uninitiate."

3[35] "Textual criticism often makes its finest show of strength in precisely those places where it offers reasons as to the degree of persuasion attainable on both sides, and why an expression or a passage cannot be

emended. It seems to us that doctors, to whom textual critics sometimes compare themselves, are acquainted with quite similar triumphs in their art."

3[36] So deeply and frequently oppressive is the *uncertainty* in scholarly *intuition* that it sometimes becomes a morbid passion to *believe* at any price and a hunger for *certainly*: e.g., as concerns Aristotle, or in discovering numerical necessities—almost a disease in Lachmann.

3.

3[37] By now it will not surprise us that the culture of our age, given such teachers, is worthless. I will never refrain from describing their lack of culture. And precisely with respect to those things where, if a man can learn at all, he *must* learn from antiquity (e.g., writing, speaking, etc.).

3[38] Besides the great number of incompetent philologists there is the converse—a number of men who are born philologists but are hindered for several reasons from realizing themselves. But the most serious obstacle in the way of these born philologists is the misrepresentation of philology by philologists without vocation.

3[39] The *insincere enthusiasm* for the classics, with which many classicists live. When we are young, the classics actually overwhelm us with a mass of trivia; in particular, we think we have outgrown classical ethics. And between Homer and Sir Walter Scott—who takes the prize? Let us be honest. If this enthusiasm were great, men would hardly look for a living from it. In my opinion: what we can get from the Greeks only begins to dawn on us *later*; only after we have experienced much, meditated a great deal.

3[40] Where is the effect of antiquity visible? Surely not in language, not in the imitation of this or that, surely not in the perversity shown by the French. Our museums are crammed; I always feel nauseated when I see quite naked statues in the Greek style—when I am confronted with this mindless philistinism that wants to devour everything.

3[41] In school graduation programs speakers actually compare our age with the age of Pericles: they congratulate themselves on the reawakening of patriotism. And I recall a parody of Pericles' Funeral Oration by G. Freytag, in which that pompous prig of a poet described the happiness which is nowadays experienced by men in their sixties—the whole thing was sheer *caricature*! So this is the effect of the classics! Deep sorrow and scorn and seclusion is all that is left those who have *seen* more than this.

3[42] They have forgotten how to speak to other men. And since they *cannot* speak to the older generation, they *cannot* speak to the young either.

3[43] They lack a real pleasure in the powerful and rigorous elements of the ancient world. They become *eulogists* and thereby make themselves ridiculous.

3[44] Wolf says: "The intellectual sap and nourishment to be got from well-digested scholarship is always extremely small."

3[45] "Only the ability to write as the ancients wrote, only a personal creative talent, equip us for fully understanding unfamiliar creations of a similar kind and to garner there more than certain secondary virtues."

3[46] Wolf then points out the ancient world was familiar only with theories of rhetoric and poetry which aided creation, *τέχναι* and *artes* which actually developed orators and poets—"whereas we at the present day will soon have theories with whose help a man could no more write a speech or a poem than he could create a thunderstorm from a thesis on brontology."

3[47] "In sum, truly consummate scholarship should be restricted solely to those few who are born with artistic talent, provided with erudition, and who take advantage of the best opportunities for acquiring the necessary technical knowledge, both practical and theoretical."—Wolf. True!

3[48] The classics, according to *Goethe*, are "the despair of the imitator."

Voltaire said: "If Homer's admirers were honest, they would admit the boredom which their favorite so often causes them."

4.

3[49] When I say that the Greeks were generally *more moral* than modern men, what does this mean? The utter visibility of the spirit in conduct surely shows that they were without shame; that they lacked bad conscience. They were more open, more passionate, like artists. There is a kind of child-like naïveté about them. Thus in everything bad they do, they have a touch of purity, something close to holiness. A remarkable degree of individuality: isn't there a higher morality in that? If we think that character develops slowly, what is it that, in point of fact, produces so much individuality? Vanity in conflict? Emulation? Perhaps. Small taste for the conventional.

3[50] Note how differently a discipline and a special family talent are transmitted. Physical transmission of a particular science is something extremely rare. Are the sons of classical scholars likely to become classical scholars? *Dubito*. Then there is no accumulation of philological talent as there was, say, of musical talent in Beethoven's family. Most scholars start from scratch, and they are aided of course by *books*, not by travelling, etc. But education above all.

3[51] The *shades* in Homer's *Hades*—what sort of existence are they really modelled on? I believe it is a portrait of the classicist. Surely it is better to be the "lowest serf on earth" than such a bloodless memory of the past—of great things and small. (Sacrifice of many sheep.)

3[52] The classicist's posture toward the ancient world is either *apologetic* or inspired by the purpose of proving that what our age values highly was valued by the ancients. The right starting-point is the opposite: that is, to proceed from the recognition of modern perversity and to look backward—many shocking things in the ancient world then appear as profoundly necessary.

We must recognize clearly that we make ourselves look utterly *absurd* when we justify and explain away antiquity: who are *we*?

3[53] For the supreme images in every religion there is an analogue in a condition of the soul. The god of *Mohammed*: the loneliness of the desert, distant roar of the lion, vision of a terrible warrior. The god of the *Christians*: everything that men and women mean by the word "love." The god of the *Greeks*: a beautiful shape in a dream.

3[54] The man who has no feeling for the *symbolic* has no feeling for the ancient world. Apply this principle to pedestrian classicists.

3[55] It is the business of the *free man* to live for his own sake, and not with regard to others. This is why the Greeks considered manual labor unbecoming.

3[56] Very little can be won by sheer force of hard work, if the mind is dull. The philologists who hurl themselves on Homer think that *violence* gets results. The classics speak to us when they want to; not when we want it.

3[57] Bentley's remarkable daughter Joanna expressed regret that he spent so much time and talent criticizing the texts of others rather than on his own writing. Bentley was silent for a while, as though meditating. Finally he said that her remark was justified. He himself felt that he might perhaps have used his natural gifts for other things. In his younger days, however, he had done something for the glory of God and the benefit of his fellow men (a reference to his *Confutation of Atheism*). But afterwards the genius of the pagan writers had lured him away, and, *despairing of achieving their level in any other way*, he had climbed onto their shoulders so as to look out over their heads.

3[58] "The moderns owe the Greeks an immense debt because, among the Greeks, who always sought the Useful before the Beautiful, not all knowledge was a class-privilege; because the higher culture was not wholly reduced to the service of civil government; because even various studies, which must as a kind of luxury go without remuneration, were never denied to anyone who renounced help from the state."

3[59] Wolf's judgment on amateurs in classical studies is remarkable: "If they were naturally endowed with talents akin to the genius of the ancients or capable of

nimbly adapting to alien intellectual modes and conditions of life, they surely acquired, from their middling knowledge of the best authors, more of the wealth of those powerful natures and great patterns of thought and action, than most of those who gave their entire lives to the interpretation of the ancients."

5.

3[60] As a man stands in respect to his profession—sceptical and pessimistic—so we should stand in respect to the highest profession of a nation: the *understanding* of what *life* is.

3[61] My consolation applies particularly to the individuals who are tyrannized. Let these men simply treat all those majorities as their assistants. In the same way let them make use of that bias in favor of classical studies which still prevails; they need *many* assistants. But they must have absolute *understanding of their goals*.

3[62] Philology as knowledge of the ancient world cannot, of course, last forever; its material is exhaustible. What cannot be exhausted is the always new adjustment every age makes to the classical world, of measuring ourselves against it. If we set the philologist the task of better understanding *his own* age by means of antiquity, then his task is eternal.—This is the antinomy of philology. *The ancient world* has in fact always been understood only *in terms of the present*—and should *the present* now be understood *in terms of the ancient world*? More precisely: men have explained the ancient world in terms of their own experience; and from what they have in this way obtained of the classical world, they have *appraised* and evaluated their own experience. Hence *experience* is clearly an absolute prerequisite for

a classicist. Which means: the classicist must first be a man; only then will he be creative as a classicist. It follows from this that older men are suited to be classicists, so long as they were *not* already classicists in that period of their life which was richest in experience.

But in general: only through knowledge of the present can one acquire *the inclination for classical* antiquity. Without this knowledge, where could the inclination come from? If we observe how few philologists there are—apart from those who earn a living at it—we can judge how matters really stand with this inclination toward antiquity. It *barely* exists, since there are no disinterested philologists.

This, then, is the task set us: to overcome the general educational influence of philology! *Means*: reduction of the philological profession; doubtful whether the young should be acquainted with it. Criticism of the philologist. The value of the ancient world: it sinks with you. How terribly you must have fallen, since it has such small value now!

3[63] Most men obviously do not regard themselves as *really* being *individuals*; their lives show this. The Christian demand that *each* man look *solely* to his own salvation is in contrast to the general life of mankind, in which each man lives merely as a point between other points, not only wholly conditioned by earlier generations but also living solely with a view to posterity. Only in three forms of existence does man remain an individual: as philosopher, as saint, and as artist. Simply observe how the scholar murders his own life: what does the teaching of Greek particles have to do with the meaning of life?—Here too we see, then, how innumerable men really live only as a forerunner of a real man: the scholar, for instance, as a forerunner of the philosopher, who knows how to use the scholar's ant-like labor to express an opinion on the *value of life*. Clearly when done without *guidance*, the *greatest part* of that ant-work is simply *nonsense* and superfluous.

3[64] Most men are clearly in the world by *accident*: no higher necessity is visible in them. They putter at this or that; their talent is mediocre. How strange! Their way of living shows they have no self-respect; they expose themselves by degrading themselves on trivia (petty passions or professional minutiae). In the so-called "vocations" which everyone must choose, there is a pathetic *modesty* in men. They say in effect: "We are 'called' in order to serve our fellow-men and be useful to them, and the same is true of our neighbor and his neighbor too." And so each man serves another; nobody has a "calling" to exist for himself, but always for others. Thus we have a tortoise, which rests upon another tortoise, and so on and on. When each man finds his own purpose in another, then *nobody has in himself any purpose in existing*. And this "existing for others" is the most comical of comedies.

3[65] The organizing of social and political conditions to produce the greatest happiness and comfort is found least of all among the Greeks. This is the goal that hovers before our visionaries of the future. Horrible! Judgment must be made, then, according to this principle: the greater the intelligence, the greater the suffering (as the Greeks make clear). So too: the greater the stupidity, the greater the comfort. The philistine is the most comfortable creature the sun ever shone on; and he is correspondingly stupid.

3[66] It is a misconception to say: there has always been a caste which managed a nation's culture; and for this reason *scholars* are necessary. For scholars possess nothing but knowledge about culture (and this only in the best of cases). There may well be cultured men even among us, hardly a whole caste. But there could be only a *very few*.

3[67] Preoccupation with cultural epochs of the past is gratitude? Look to the past in order to explain the

state of modern culture; surely not to eulogize our own state. But perhaps we must, so as not to be too *hard* on ourselves.

3[68] My aim is: to create complete hostility between our modern "culture" and the ancient world. Whoever wants to serve the former must *hate* the latter.

3[69] Very scrupulous reflection leads to the view that we are a multiplication of many pasts: how then can we also be a final end?—But why not? Yet this is what most of us don't want to be. We want to join the ranks again, work in a corner, and hope that our work won't be utterly lost to posterity. But this is actually the Danaids' jar. It is no use. We must do everything over for ourselves, and only for ourselves. For instance, we must measure scholarship in regard to ourselves by asking: what is scholarship to *us*? But not: what are we to scholarship? We make life too easy for ourselves when we take such simple historical views and make ourselves servants. "Your own salvation matters more than anything else"—we should say to ourselves; and there is no institution you should value more highly than your own soul.—But now, a man learns to know himself: he discovers he is miserable, he despises himself, and he rejoices to find something outside himself worthy of his respect. And so he throws himself away by filling a niche somewhere, sternly doing his duty, and atoning for his existence. He knows that he doesn't work for his own sake; he would like to help those who dare to exist for themselves; like Socrates. Most men drift in mid-air like a bunch of balloons, swayed by every breath of wind.—*Result: The scholar must be a scholar from self-knowledge, that is, out of contempt for himself. In short, he must know himself as the servant of a higher man who will come after him. Otherwise he is a sheep.*

3[70] It is thought that philology is finished—and I believe it hasn't yet begun.

The greatest events to befall philology are the appearance of *Goethe*, *Schopenhauer*, and *Wagner*. With their help we can gaze into the distance. The fifth and sixth centuries can now be discovered.

3[71] I recommend in place of Latin the cultivation of the Greek style, above all Demosthenes. Simplicity! Refer to Leopardi, who is probably the greatest stylist of the century.

3[72] *Graius—praeter laudem nullius avaris*, says Horace. He calls their chief activities *nugari* (*Ep.* 2,93), which is typical of a Roman.

3[73] Wolf: "In any case it is a prejudice to believe that the history of political struggles becomes more credible the closer it comes to our own times."

3[74] *Chief points of view* with respect to the future value of the classics,

1. They are not for the young, since they exhibit man in freedom from shame.
2. They are not to be imitated directly, but they teach us how art achieved its highest perfection to date.
3. They are accessible to only a few, and there should be a cultural police in charge of them, as there should be for bad pianists who play Beethoven.
4. These few, as critics of the present, measure our age against antiquity, and they measure antiquity in terms of their own ideals, and are thus critics of antiquity.
5. The contrast between Hellenic and Roman, and again between early and late Hellenic, should be studied.
—Clarification of the different kinds of culture.

3[75] I want to say once and for all everything I no longer believe—also what I do believe.

Man stands in a great maelstrom of forces and imagines that this maelstrom is rational and has a rational purpose. An error!

The only rational thing we know is the little reason possessed by man; he must strain it to the utmost, and if he ever wants to abandon himself to "Providence," it always ends in his ruin. The only happiness lies in reason; everything else in the world is miserable. But I see the highest reason in the work of the artist, and he can experience it as such. There may be something which, if it could be consciously produced, would give a greater feeling of reason and happiness; for instance, the movement of the solar system, the creation and formation of a man.

Happiness lies in swiftness of feeling and thoughts; everything else is slow, gradual, and stupid. The man who could experience the movement of light would be a very happy man, since light is very swift.

Thinking about ourselves brings little happiness. If, however, we feel very happy when doing so, the reason is that we are not really thinking of ourselves but of our ideal. This is far off, and only the swift man reaches it and rejoices.

Organizing a great society for producing better men is the task of the future. The individual must accustom himself to such demands that, when he affirms himself, he also affirms the will of that society; e.g., in choosing a wife, or the way in which his child should be educated. Until now no individual was free, apart from very rare exceptions; and these individuals were conditioned by similar ideas, although the goals of the individual were poorly and incoherently organized.

3[76] If we look from the character and culture of the *Catholic Middle Ages* back to the *Greeks*, the Greeks shine in the splendor of a higher *humanity*. For every reproach brought against the Greeks must be brought

a fortiori against the Middle Ages. Thus the veneration of the ancients in the Renaissance is entirely honorable and just. We for our part have advanced in one particular, precisely in respect to that dawning ray of light. Through natural and human history we have surpassed the Greeks in *explaining* the world; and our information is much greater, our judgments more moderate and just. Moreover, thanks to the Enlightenment, a gentler humanity now prevails, which has *weakened* mankind—but the weakness, transformed into morality, looks very good and does us honor. Man now possesses very great freedom; and if he makes small use of it, that is his business. Fanaticism of opinion has softened considerably. Finally, the fact that we would rather live in the present age than in any other is essentially due to science. And surely in no other generation have there been so many noble enjoyments as in our own—even if our generation has neither the stomach nor the palate for experiencing much joy.—But life amidst all this “freedom” is only good provided we want merely to understand it, and not participate in it—that is the modern dilemma. The participants seem to be less charming than ever; how stupid they must be!

Thus the danger arises that knowledge may revenge itself on us just as ignorance took its revenge on us during the Middle Ages. Religions which believe in gods, providences, in rational world-orders, in miracles and sacraments, are finished; certain types of the holy life, of asceticism, are also obsolete, since we freely infer that these originate in a damaged brain and sickness. There is no doubt that the antithesis between a pure, incorporeal soul and a body has almost been discarded. Who now believes in the immortality of the soul? Everything pertaining to salvation and damnation—which was based upon certain mistaken physiological assumptions—became untenable as soon as these assumptions were recognized as false. Modern scientific hypotheses, however, can just as well be interpreted and used for a stultifying philistinism—indeed for bestiality—as for the realm of grace and the spirit. In comparison with all earlier ages

our foundation is new; for this reason something can still be expected from the human race.—As *regards culture*, this means that until now we have known only *one* perfect form, the city-state of the Greeks, whose basis is mythical and social; and *one* imperfect form, the Roman, as a decoration of life, derived from the Greek. All these bases, the mythical and socio-political, have now changed; our pretended culture has no stability because it has been built on shaky, indeed already crumbling, conditions and beliefs.—So if we fully understand Greek culture, we see that it is gone for good. Thus the philologist is *the great sceptic* in our cultural and educational circumstances: that is his mission.—Lucky he, if like Wagner and Schopenhauer, he has a presentiment of those auspicious powers in which a new culture is stirring.

[5 === U II 8b. Spring-Summer, 1875.]

5[1] A fresh beginning is always an illusion; even the impulse that drives us toward this putative “beginning” is the effect and result of something earlier. But a sudden halt, of such violence and decisiveness, is indicative of the violence and extremity of our former momentum. The radical nature of our opinions and our truth comes from the radical nature of our mistakes and failures. The great law of *transformation*—here all so-called “progress” lies. Basically moral judgment must always remain the same. But whereas intellect and experience grow, the moral quality is always transformed. Ultimately we value a theory according to its *effects*, e.g., whether it kills or perverts many men. This is not right.—

5[2] To reconstruct the ancient world in writings—a still unresolved problem.

5[3] The faith in individuality—could it conceivably not exist? In any case we are moving toward times in which human opinions will become extremely uniform;

but just as individuals become more and more alike, they will be more and more divided. Hostility then will appear in minute, but ever sharper, differences.

5[4] Needed: an exact cross-comparison of Greeks and classicists, why mutual understanding *must* be difficult. This would entail characterizing the Greeks.

5[5] Ultimately all religions rest on certain physical assumptions, which *already* exist and which adapt the religions to themselves. In Christianity, for instance, the contrast between body and soul, the absolute importance of the earth as "the world," miraculous events in nature. As soon as opposite views come to prevail—e.g., strict natural law, the impotence and irrelevance of all gods, the extremely narrow view of the soul as bodily process—*then everything is over. But the whole of Greek culture now rests upon such views.*

5[6] In Thucydides the agreeable feeling, as of turning a lock with a key: a gradual, reluctant giving way, but always functional, always achieving its end.

In Aristotle the spectacle of whitening bones.

5[7] The tyrants of the mind have almost always been murdered too, and they too have only a scant posterity.

5[8] *Transmission of emotion* is hereditary: so we might infer from the effect of the Greeks on classicists.

5[9] How is it possible to exalt and glorify a whole nation merely? It is individuals that count, even among the Greeks.

5[10] There is a great deal of *caricature* among the Greeks too; e.g., the concern about their own happiness among the Cynics.

5[11] It is only the relation between a people and the education of the individual that interests me. In this respect there are certainly among the Greeks some things very favorable to the development of the individual, deriving, however, not from the nation's *good quality*, but from the conflict of evil instincts.

Thanks to happy discoveries, the great individual can be educated in a wholly different and better way than by leaving his education to chance, as has been the case until now. My hopes lie here: in the training of significant men.

5[12] Until now the history of Greece has always been written optimistically.

5[13] The desire to have some sort of certainty in aesthetics led to the worship of Aristotle. It will gradually be proven, I believe, that he understands nothing about art, and that what we so admire in him is merely the echo of clever Athenian conversation.

5[14] The Greeks are interesting and extravagantly important because they have so many great individuals. How was that possible? A problem for study.

5[15] With the disappearance of Christianity a good part of antiquity too has become incomprehensible, particularly the whole religious basis of life. Certainly for this reason an imitation of the classics is a wrong direction; the classicists who still consider it are either betrayers or betrayed. We live in a period when different

views of life exist side by side: this is why the age is so instructive—as few ages are—and also so sick, since it suffers the evils of every tendency simultaneously. Man of the future: the European man.

5[16] Historical knowledge today means: the *recognition* that all men who believe in Providence have simplified matters for themselves. There is no Providence. If human affairs proceed violently and chaotically, don't believe that a god thereby intended something or permitted it. We can generally observe that the history of Christianity on earth is one of the most frightful chapters of history, and that it *must* be ended for good. Through Christianity, of course, the ancient world has doubtless managed to survive into our own times; and if Christianity declines, our understanding of antiquity declines still more. Now is the best time to recognize it: we are no longer guided by any prejudice in favor of Christianity, but we still understand it and the antiquity still contained in it, so far as it agrees with Christianity.

5[17] The decline of the *scholar-poets* is due in large part to their own personal depravity. The breed thrives again later. *Goethe* and *Leopardi*, for example, are manifestations of it. Behind them plod the pure philologists. The whole breed arises in the Sophistic movement of the second century.

5[18] At the close of antiquity, completely unchristian characters can still be found, who are more beautiful, purer, and more harmonious than all the Christians; e.g., Proclus. His mysticism, his syncretism are things for which Christianity can least of all reproach him. In any case it is with *men like this* that I would like to live. In contrast to *them*, Christianity seems merely the coarsest vulgarization, designed for rabble and criminals.

5[19] Every historical school has tried its hand with the ancient world. *Critical* consideration is the only thing left. By which I don't of course mean textual criticism and literary-historical criticism.

5[20] *To bring to light the irrational in human affairs*, without any shame—that is the purpose of *our brothers and colleagues*. As a result a distinction will have to be drawn between what in this is fundamental and cannot be improved, and what can still be improved. But “Providence” should be kept out of it; for this is a concept by which things are oversimplified. I want to breathe the breath of *this* purpose into scholarship. To advance *the knowledge of man!* The good and the rational in man is something fortuitous, fictitious or the opposite of something very irrational. Someday the only thought will be of *education*.

5[21] I do not teach submission to *Necessity*—since this would mean first *knowing* it was necessary. There may perhaps be many necessities, but in general the notion is nothing but a lazy evasion.

5[22] *Signs* and *wonders* are not believed; only a “Providence” needs such things. There is no help, whether in prayer, or asceticism, or visions. If this is what religion is, then religion no longer exists for me.

My religion, if I can still use the word, lies in the task of producing the genius. Education is everything we can hope for; all consolation is called art. *Education is love for the procreated*, an excess of love beyond love of self. Religion is “*Love beyond ourselves.*” *The work of art is the image of such self-transcending love, and a perfect image.*

5[23] The *stupidity of the will* is Schopenhauer's greatest thought, if thoughts are judged by their power.

It can be seen in Hartmann how he promptly juggled this thought away. Something stupid will never be called God.

5[24] This, then, is the novelty in all future human activity: men must never again be *ruled* by religious concepts. Will they then perhaps become *worse*? I don't find that their behavior is moral and good under the yoke of religion. I am not on Demopheles' side. The fear of the next world and especially the religious fear of divine punishment have hardly made men better.

5[25] When something great appears and lasts for a certain length of time, we can infer that it was preceded by a very painstaking nurture, e.g., among the Greeks, how did so many men among them achieve their freedom?

Educators, educate? But first educators must educate themselves. It is for these I write.

5[26] The *denial of life* is no longer so easily achieved: you can become a hermit or a monk—what is denied by that? This idea must be deeper nowadays: it is above all *a discriminating denial, a denial founded on the desire to be just, not the wholesale denial it once was.*

The man who wants to be holy and good has a harder time of it today. In order to be good, he cannot be as *unjust* in regard to *knowledge* as the earlier saints were. He must be a knowledge-saint, blending love and wisdom; and he must have nothing further to do with a belief in gods or demigods or providence (just as the Indian saints had nothing to do with them). He must also be healthy and remain healthy; otherwise he will begin to doubt himself. And perhaps he will be quite unlike an ascetic saint—but perhaps like a man-about-town.

5[27] Every kind of history has already been applied to the ancient world. Above all, we have learned enough to profit from the history of antiquity—without foundering on antiquity itself.

5[28] The German Reformation separated us from antiquity: was this necessary? It revealed anew the old contradiction "Paganism—Christianity." At the same time it was a protest against the *decorative culture* of the Renaissance; it was a victory over the same culture which was defeated when Christianity began.

5[29] In regard to "worldly things," Christianity has preserved precisely the coarser views of the ancients. Everything noble in marriage, slavery, the state, is unchristian. Christianity *required* the distorting aspects of worldliness in order to prove its *own* value.

5[30] *I dream of a fellowship of men who are uncompromising, unindulgent, and want to be called "Destroyers." They apply the measure of their criticism to everything and sacrifice themselves to Truth. What is bad and false must be exposed! We do not want to build prematurely. We do not know whether we can ever build, or whether the best thing would be not to build at all. There are lazy pessimists, fatalists who will not fight—to these we refuse to belong!*

5[31] Peculiarly significant position of the philologists: a whole profession to which the young are entrusted and which has to investigate a special antiquity. Clearly the highest value is attached to this antiquity. But if antiquity has been wrongly evaluated, then the basis for the philologist's lofty position suddenly disappears. In any case antiquity has been evaluated in very different ways; and the value assigned the philologist

has always been determined accordingly. This profession has obtained its power from the strong prejudices in favor of antiquity—This should be elaborated. —At present the philologist feels that, if these prejudices were at last thoroughly compared and antiquity were accurately described, that bias in favor of the philologist would promptly vanish. *It is therefore a matter of professional self-interest to prevent a purer view of antiquity from emerging; above all, the view that antiquity makes a man un-modern in the deepest sense.*

Secondly, it is in the professional interest of philologists to prevent the appearance of any view of the teacher's mission higher than they are capable of satisfying.

5[32] There are, one hopes, a few people who find it puzzling why philologists in particular should be the educators of the nobler youth. Perhaps this won't always be the case. —In itself it would be much more natural if the young were taught the essentials of geography, natural science, political economy, sociology; if they were gradually introduced to the consideration of life and finally, later on, to the most remarkable periods of the past. In this way *knowledge of antiquity* would be the last knowledge to be acquired; is *this position* of the classics in education *more honorable* than the usual one? —At present antiquity is used as a propaedeutic, for thinking, speaking, writing. *There was a time* when it was *the sum-total of human knowledge, and students wanted, by mastering it, to acquire what they now want to acquire through the curriculum described (which has changed in accordance with the advanced knowledge of the age).* Thus the inner *purpose* of classical education has wholly changed; what was once *material* education is now *merely formal*.

5[33] The blending of *humanism* and *religious rationalism* is rightly emphasized as a Saxon trait by Köchly: the type of these classicists is *Gottfried Hermann*.

5[34] Is it true that the classicist, insofar as he employs antiquity in *formal education*, is himself *formally educated*?

But what an antithesis! Formal and material indeed! Material here means information, facts. Formal means the way people think, speak, write, quite *as though* they acquire information and then diffuse it!

5[35] If it were the classicist's task to provide *formal education*, he would have to teach walking, dancing, speaking, singing, deportment, conversation. And this was pretty much what was taught by the formal teachers of the second and third century. But nowadays the only thought is the education of the *professional scholar*, and here "formal" means: thinking and writing, hardly any speaking.

5[36] Select aspects of antiquity, e.g., the power, the fire, the verve of the ancient feeling for music (shown by the first Pythian ode); the purity of their historical sense, and gratitude for the blessings of civilization: fire-festivals, corn-festivals. The ennobling of jealousy; the Greeks the most jealous people. Suicide, hatred of old age, e.g., of poverty. Empedocles on sexual love.

5[37] I *deplore* an *education* in which an understanding of Wagner is not achieved, which makes Schopenhauer sound crude and dissonant. Such an education is a failure.

5[38] The German has waged a long war against antiquity, that is, against the *old* culture. Certainly it is precisely what is best and profoundest in the German that resists it. But the chief point is that this resistance is justified only in the case of Romanized culture. This culture is already a decline from a much more profound and nobler culture. It is this culture that the German is wrong to resist.

5[39] I see in classicists *a conspiratorial society which wants to educate the young in classical culture*. I could understand it if this group and its aims were criticized on all sides. Then a great deal would depend on knowing what these classicists *mean* by "classical culture." —If I see, for instance, that their education is contrary to German philosophy and music, I would fight either *them* or *classical culture*—in the former case perhaps by showing that these classicists have not understood classical culture. Now I see: 1) great changes in the value assigned antiquity by the classicists. 2) something deeply unclassical in classicists, something unfree. 3) confusion as to *which* ancient culture they mean. 4) considerable perversity in their methods, e.g., scholarship. 5) adulterations by Christianity.

5[40] A healthy, active body; pure and profound sense in the observation of things close at hand; free manliness; belief in good race and good education; military ability; jealousy in ἀριστεύειν; delight in the arts; respect for free leisure; feeling for free individuals, for the symbolic.

5[41] A course on "Principles of Culture"

1. The purpose of culture, at last clearly recognized.
2. History of previous purposes and their errors.
3. Means of culture.

5[42] *Plans for Life*

Unmodern Considerations. For my thirties.

The Greeks. For the years between forty and fifty.

Discourses on Humanity. For my fifties.

5[43] Supposedly the preparatory school educates students for a discipline. It is now said, however, that it can no longer prepare students for any discipline, so extensive have all branches of learning become. Therefore, students must be trained generally, that is, for all

fields of knowledge, which is to say for professional scholarship itself—and classical studies are useful for this! A remarkable leap! An argument of total despair. What exists must be regarded as right, even after it is clearly seen that the right on which it has hitherto been based, is now wrong.

5[44] It is the same with regard to the simplicity of antiquity as it is with simplicity of style. It is the supreme trait—something to be recognized and imitated—but also the last. Remember that the classical prose of the Greeks is also a late development.

5[45] The basis for the universal esteem for antiquity is prejudices. Do away with these, and the esteem would perforce turn into a deep hatred. Do the classicists at present foster these prejudices? Then they are ignorant of the ancient world. If they don't foster them—what about their honesty then? But where is it clear that they deliberately destroy antiquity?

5[46] Do the classicists know the present? Their views of it as "Periclean"; their errors of judgment, as when they talk of Freytag's "Homeric genius" etc.; their tagging along while the literary men lead the van. Their renunciation of the pagan sense, precisely the ancient element that Goethe detected in Winckelmann.

5[47] Our *attitude toward classical antiquity is basically the profound cause of the sterility of modern culture*: we have in fact borrowed this whole modern notion of culture from the Hellenized Romans. We must *distinguish* in antiquity itself: at the same time we learn to recognize its only creative period, we also *condemn* the whole Alexandrian-Roman culture. *But at the same time we condemn our whole attitude toward antiquity and our classical scholarship with it.*

5[48] An example—and a common one—of the way in which classical studies are carried on. A man unthinkingly throws himself—or is thrown—into some field of study. From here he looks to right and left, sees much that is good and new. But in an unguarded moment, he says to himself: "What the devil does all this have to do with me?" In the meantime he has grown old, become used to it, and goes on in his rut—just as in marriage.

5[49] On the whole, modern philology has lost its leading strings; those who formerly led it are now renounced. But on the whole its entire influence and value rest on the fame of that earlier leadership, e.g., the fame of the humanistic culture.

5[50] There are things about which antiquity is instructive, about which I would hardly care to express myself in public.

5[51] It is almost laughable to see how strongly all the sciences and arts in the modern period spring up from seeds scattered by antiquity, and how in this respect Christianity seems only a killing frost in a long night—a night in which it was inevitably believed that everything rational and honest among men had vanished for good. The war against the natural man has created the unnatural man.

5[52] There is something disrespectful in the way in which we introduce the young to the ancients. Even worse, it is bad pedagogy. What, after all, can come from acquaintance with things which a young man simply cannot consciously honor? Perhaps he must learn to *take it on faith*; and that is why I want none of it.

5[53] Those who say, "But certainly classical culture always survives as an object of pure scholarship, even if

all its educational ends are disavowed," deserve this reply: Where is pure scholarship here? Achievements and qualities must be *assessed*, and the man who assesses must do so from above. Thus your first concern must be to surpass antiquity. Until you do that, your scholarship is not pure, but impure and limited: as it palpably is.

5[54] How it stands with the classicists is clear in their indifference to the appearance of Wagner. They could have learned even more through him than through Goethe—and they didn't even glance in his direction. Which shows: they have no strong needs, or they would have had a feeling where their food was to be found.

5[55] *Chapter 1*

Of all branches of learning philology until now the most favored; the greatest numbers; promoted in every country for hundreds of years; charged with the training of the nobler youth, and hence the handsomest inducement for propagating themselves, for inspiring *respect*. How has it acquired this power?

Reckoning of the various prejudices in its favor.

But suppose these were recognized as prejudices? — Would philology still survive, if professional interest and livelihood were no longer involved? What if the truth were told about the classics and their capacity to educate for the present?

Chapter 2

In answer to the above, review the education of the philologist, his origin: when self-interest is abolished, he fails to appear.

Chapter 3

If the general public ever discovered how utterly unmodern antiquity really is, the classicists would lose their posts as teachers.

Chapter 4

Philology owes its present power only to the coalition between philologists who *will not*, or *cannot*, understand the ancient world, and public opinion, which is guided by prejudices in favor of antiquity.

Chapter 5

The philologist of the future as sceptic of our whole culture, and thereby destroyer of professional philology.

5[56] Would philology still exist as a discipline, if its servants were not salaried teachers? In Italy there were such men. Who could put a German beside Leopardi, for example?

5[57] Effect of classical studies on non-classicists exactly nil. If the classicists were imperious and dared say No, how they would be persecuted. But they grovel.

The Greeks as they actually are, and their enfeeblement by philologists.

5[58] Until now all history has been written from the standpoint of success, indeed with the assumption of intelligence behind success. So with Greek history; we still possess none. But it is the same everywhere: where are the historians who can view events without succumbing to the prevalent humbug? I see only one—Burckhardt. Flat optimism everywhere in the discipline. The question, "What would have happened if this or that event had not taken place?" is almost unanimously rejected, and yet it is precisely the key question, whereby everything turns ironic. One has only to consider his own life. If we seek for design in history, we should seek it in the purpose of a powerful man, or of a generation perhaps, or a political party. Everything else is chaos. —Even in natural science this deification of the *necessary* is found.

Germany has become the hothouse of historical op-

timism; Hegel may be responsible for this. But in no other regard has the influence of German culture been more disastrous. Everything that is suppressed by success gradually rebels; history as the victors' scorn; slavish feelings and prostration before the Fact—a "feeling for the state" they call it now! As though that needed to be implanted! The man who does not grasp the brutality and senselessness of history will not understand the impulse to make history meaningful. Note how seldom a man understands the meaning of his own life, as Goethe did. What sort of rationality, then, will emerge from all these veiled and blind existences, working chaotically together and at cross purposes?

Hence it is particularly naive when Hellwald, the author of a cultural history, rejects all "ideals" because history has always disposed of them, one after another.

5[59]

*Greeks and Classicists**The Greeks:*

pay homage to beauty
 develop the body
 speak well
 are religious transfigurers of
 ordinary things
 are listeners and observers

 are prone to symbolism
 possess freedom as men

 have a pure outlook on the
 world
 are intellectual pessimists

The Classicists:

are windbags and triflers
 are repulsive
 stutter
 are filthy pedants

 are hair splitters and
 screech-owls
 are incapable of symbolism
 are passionate slaves of the
 State
 are twisted Christians

 are philistines

5[60] It is true that humanism has made a military alliance with antiquity. So it is natural that the enemies of humanism should be hostile to antiquity. Except that antiquity as seen by humanism was badly misunderstood and wholly falsified; when clearly understood, it is evi-

dence *against* humanism, against the notion of human nature as basically good, etc. The enemies of humanism are mistaken when they quarrel with antiquity; in it they have a strong ally.

5[61] Religions I regard as *narcotics*. But when they are given to such nations as the Germans, they are pure *poison*.

5[62] On what condition do only the Greeks model their life in Hades? Bloodless, dreamlike, weak: it is *old age* repeated and intensified: in which memory is increasingly faint and the body even weaker. The senility of senility—this is our life in the eyes of the Greeks.

5[63] How *real* the Greeks were, even in free invention! How they made poetry out of reality, instead of longing to escape it!

5[64] Education begins with a lesson in *the necessary*, then in *the changing* and *the variable*. The student is introduced to Nature and everywhere shown the power of its laws; then the laws of civil society. Here the question will arise: *must* things be as they are? Gradually the student feels a need for history in order to learn how things became what they are. But at the same time he learns that they could be different. How much power over things does man have? That is the question in all education. To show how completely different things can be, look at the example of the Greeks. The Romans are needed to show how things *became* what they are.

5[65] The Greeks as the only nation of genius in world history. They possess genius as learners too; this is what they understand best. And they know more than

how to dress up in borrowed finery, like the Romans.

The organization of the *polis* is a Phoenician invention; even this was copied by the Greeks. For a long time, like happy dilettantes, they studied everything around them; even Aphrodite is Phoenician. And they refused to disown their importations, the non-indigenous.

5[66] The Egyptians are a *much more literary* people than the Greeks. On this I oppose Wolf.

5[67] The first grain at Eleusis, the first vine in Thebes, the first olive, the first fig.

5[68] Egyptians had essentially lost their myth.

5[69] The *flesh-and-blood epiphanies* of gods, as in Sappho's hymn to Aphrodite, must *not* be taken as poetic licence: they are frequent hallucinations. Many things, such as the *wish for death*, we view too flatly as rhetoric.

5[70] Greeks the *genius* among the nations.
Childlike nature. Credulous.

Passionate. Unconscious of their life productive of genius. Enemies of constraint and stupidity. Pain. Imprudent behavior. Their intuitive understanding of misery, combined with a sunny temperament, genial and cheerful. Deep understanding and glorification of everyday things (fire, agriculture). Deceitful. Unhistorical. The cultural importance of the *polis* instinctively understood; its center and periphery are favorable to great men (affording a prospect over an entire community, also the possibility of addressing it as a whole). The individual raised to his highest powers by means of the *polis*. Envy, competition, as among talented persons.

5[71] The recreations of the Spartans consisted of festivals, hunting, and war; their daily life was too harsh. In general, however, their state is a caricature of the *polis* and a perversion of Hellas. The training of the ideal Spartan—what greatness did he have that his production required such a brutal state?

5[72] Greek culture is based upon the domination exerted by a very small class over a slave population four to five times as large. *Numerically* speaking, Greece was a country inhabited by barbarians. How can the ancients be regarded as *humane*? Contrast between the genius and the worker, half ox and beast-of-burden. The Greeks believed in a disparity of race. Schopenhauer wonders why Nature didn't prefer to invent two distinct species.

5[73] The Greek is related to the barbarian as "freely moving or winged animals stand to the mussel fastened to its rock, compelled to wait whatever chance brings it." Schopenhauer's image.

5[74] "Always to see the universal in the particular is precisely the fundamental trait of genius"—Schopenhauer. Think of Pindar, of the *Προμήθεα* etc. "Intellectual consciousness," according to Schopenhauer, is largely rooted in the *clarity* with which the Greeks looked at the world and themselves, and by which they arrived at consciousness.

5[75] The "*wide separation between the Will and the intellect*" is a trait of the genius, and also of the Greeks.

5[76] "The *melancholy* associated with genius rests on the fact that *the more brilliantly the will-to-live is illuminated by the intellect, the more clearly it perceives*

the misery of its condition." Schopenhauer. Cf. the Greeks!

5[77] What a contrast between the Romans, with their boring seriousness and the cheerful Greeks! Schopenhauer: "The firm, practical seriousness about life, which the Romans designated *gravitas* presupposes that the intellect does *not forsake* the service of the will in order to wander away after what does not concern this."

5[78] The *moderation* of the Greeks in sensual consumption, in drinking, and the pleasure they took in these things; the Olympian games and their worship—this shows what they were.

5[79] In the case of genius, "the intellect shows the faults normally present in a tool which is used for a purpose for which it is not made."

"This will is often inopportunately left in the lurch; and accordingly genius becomes more or less useless for life; in fact at times its conduct is reminiscent of madness."

5[80] "When the abnormally enlarged intellectual power suddenly, with all its energies, directs itself to the affairs and miseries of the Will—there where everything is enlarged to monstrous proportions, too vividly, in too glaring colors, in too bright a light—then the individual falls into mere extremes."

5[81] The Greeks lacked sobriety. Excessive sensibility; abnormal excitement of nerves and brain; vehemence and ardor of the Will.

5[82] The happiest fate that can befall genius is release from practical activity and free leisure; and for this reason the Greeks knew its value. The blessing of

work! *Nugari* was what the Romans called all the notions and aspirations of the Greeks.

The career of genius is not happy—it is opposed to, and at war with its age. Similarly with the Greeks: they instinctively took enormous pains to make of the *polis* a place of refuge for themselves. Finally everything collapsed in politics. They were forced to resist the outside world; this became more and more difficult, finally impossible.

5[83] By changing a single word in Lord Bacon of Verulam, we can say: *infimarum Graecorum virtutum, apud philologos laus est, mediarum admiratio, supremarum sensus nullus.*

5[84] The childlike *character* of the Greeks perceived by the Egyptians.

5[85] The *heightening* of the *present* into the *vast and eternal*, e.g., in Pindar.

5[86] The unmathematical curvature of the columns in Paestum is analogous to variation of tempo: vitality in place of mechanical movement.

5[87] The task of all education is to transform conscious actions into more or less unconscious actions; and in this sense the history of mankind is its education. Now the classicist performs a great many such unconscious actions: what I propose to study is how his power, that is, his instinctive behavior, is the result of activities which used to be conscious, which he has gradually almost ceased to experience as such. *But that consciousness consisted of prejudices. His present power rests on those prejudices*, e.g. the high regard for *ratio*, as in Bentley

and Hermann. Prejudices, as *Lichtenberg* says, are the *artistic instincts of man*.

5[88] *Skills* are expected from the study of the classics. Formerly, the ability to write and speak. But what is expected now? —The ability to think and to make inferences. But this is not to be learned *from* the ancients, but rather *by means of* the ancients, through the agency of scholarship. Moreover, all historical inference is conditional and extremely uncertain; the inferences of the natural sciences are preferable.

5[89] *Proclus*, who solemnly worships the rising moon.

5[90] The hereditary training of the contemporary philologist. A certain sterility of basic perceptions is the result, since the discipline is advanced, but not the philologists.

5[91] The political subjection of Greece is the greatest defeat suffered by culture, since it is the source of the monstrous theory that culture can be promoted only by arming oneself to the teeth and at the same time putting on boxing-gloves. The rise of Christianity was the second greatest defeat; brute strength on the one hand, and stupidity on the other, were victorious over the aristocratic genius among the nations. To be a Philhellene means being an enemy of brute strength and stupidity. Sparta was the ruin of Athens insofar as she forced Athens to form a confederation and throw herself wholly into politics.

5[92] Generally speaking, the *increase* in the *military strength of mankind* is quite certain. Victory of the *stronger* nation: little by little is the rule not only for

greater power of being of a *physical* sort, but even more for that of *mind and spirit*.

5[93] In *Socrates* we have before us an *example of the consciousness* out of which the *instincts of theoretical man* later developed. Better to die than grow old and weak in spirit.

5[94] In Christianity, a religion corresponding to a pre-Greek condition of mankind came to power: belief in magical causes everywhere, bloody sacrifices, superstitious horror of punishment by demons, failure of nerve, ecstatic brooding and hallucinations, the man turned into a battlefield between good and evil spirits.

5[95] It would have been much *more fortunate* if the *Persians*, instead of the *Romans*, had conquered the Greeks.

5[96] The splendid feeling for *order* and organization has made the city of the Athenians immortal. —The board of ten generals in Athens! Madness! Much too great a sacrifice on the altar of jealousy.

5[97] *Statute of the Society of the Unmoderns*

Each member must submit a written report of his activities every three months.

O.R.G.B.N.

5[98] For an Introduction to the complete edition of "Unmodern Considerations"

Description of its origins: my desperation because of Bayreuth; I no longer see anything which is faultless.

In deeper second thoughts I discover I have been thrust into the most fundamental problem of all culture. At times I lack the desire to go on living. But then I tell myself: if one must live, best live today. —In reality I considered Strauss too unimportant for me; I didn't want to fight him. A few words spoken by Wagner at Strassburg.

5[99] Suppose the Romans had rejected Greek culture: it might have been totally destroyed. When could such a culture have risen again? Christianity, Romans, and barbarians—that would have been an onslaught. Utterly destructive. We see the dangers among which genius lives. This is why Cicero is surely one of mankind's greatest benefactors. —There is no Providence for genius; only for the ordinary mass of mankind and their needs is there such a thing. The masses find their satisfaction, and later, their justification.

5[100] The Greek *polis* and the αἰὲν ἀπιστεύειν grow out of mutual and deadly enmity. "Hellenic" and "humane" are contradictions, though the ancients flattered themselves a good deal.

5[101] In the world of Hellenic strife, Homer is the Panhellenic Greek.

Greek competition is also visible in the symposium, in the form of clever conversation.

5[102] Genius makes tributaries of the half-talented. Hence even the Persians sent their embassies to the Greek oracles.

5[103] A Greek polytheism requires much imagination; it is possible, of course, to economize on imagination when one has only *one* [god].

5[104] Greek morality is based, not on religion, but on the *polis*.

There were only priests of individual gods, not representatives of the religion as a whole. That is, no clergy. Likewise no sacred scriptures.

5[105] The "laughter-loving gods"—this is the highest epithet ever conferred on the world. Meaning, how hard it is to live!

5[106] Have there been many philologists of talent? I doubt it. Reason has been too slow in making headway among them (numbering manuscripts, etc.). —Philology of words-and-things—stupid struggle!—and then the exaggerated regard for any clever man among them!

5[107] Humanism was strenuously cultivated by Charlemagne, whereas the harshest measures were taken against heathenism. Classical mythology was fostered; German mythology was treated as a crime. I believe the reason for this was the feeling that Christianity had already done away with ancient religion. People no longer feared it, but made use of the ancient culture which it supported. They were afraid of the old German gods. —A gross *superficiality* in the idea of the ancient world—little more than appreciation of its formal skills and knowledge—*must* have been thereby implanted. The forces which have hindered a deepening of our insight into the ancient world deserve mention. First of all, ancient culture is used as an *inducement* to the *acceptance of Christianity*. It is, as it were, the reward for conversion. The sugar in this poison concoction. In the second place, the help of ancient culture was needed as a *weapon* for the intellectual defense of Christianity. Even the Reformation could not dispense with classical studies in this sense. On the other hand, the Renaissance, in a *purser* but quite anti-Christian way, begins classical studies; the Renaissance in the South shows, like the Reforma-

tion in the North, an awakening of *honesty*. Compromise, of course, was impossible, since a serious inclination to the classics makes one unchristian. On the whole it is the Church that *succeeded* in giving classical studies a *harmless* direction: *the philologist was discovered*, a scholar who in other respects is a priest or some such thing. And even in the area of the Reformation they also succeeded in castrating the scholar. *Friedrich August Wolf* is remarkable on this account because he *freed* his profession from theology. But his achievement was not wholly understood, since an aggressive, active element—of the sort we associate with the poet-scholars of the Renaissance—was not developed. Scholarship profited from the liberation, not men.

5[108] The *unpopularity* of the new Renaissance culture! A terrible fact!

5[109] What is antiquity *now*, in respect to modern art and science and philosophy? No longer the repository of all knowledge; in the knowledge of nature and history it has been surpassed. Oppression by the church has been halted. A *purser* knowledge of antiquity is now possible, but also perhaps a *less effective*, a weaker knowledge? — This is correct, if by “effect” we mean *effect upon the masses*; but for the molding of the greatest man the classics are *more potent than ever*. Goethe as *German poet-classicist*; Wagner as a still higher stage: clear recognition of the only position worthy of art. Never has an ancient work had so powerful an effect as that of the *Oresteia* on Wagner. The *classicist who has been castrated by objectivity*, who is in other respects a philistine and a jingoist, and who also dabbles in pure scholarship, is surely a sad spectacle.

5[110] Bentley was at the same time *defensor fidei*; and Scaliger was certainly an enemy of the Jesuits, and a very aggressive enemy.

5[111] Between *our* highest art and philosophy and what is truly recognized as the *more ancient* period of antiquity, there is no contradiction: they are mutually supporting and sustaining. My hopes are founded on this.

5[112] There are areas in which *ratio* will produce nothing but mischief, and the philologist who has nothing else is thereby lost and can never see the truth, e.g., in the study of Greek mythology. Not even a visionary, of course, has a special claim: one must have Greek imagination and something of Greek religious feeling. Even the poet need not be consistent, and, in general, consistency is the last thing the Greeks would have understood.

5[113] Almost all the Greek divinities are accumulations; one layer on top of another, some firmly fused, some barely touching. Scholarly sorting out of these strata seems to me scarcely possible, since no good method for doing so can exist. The wretched conclusion of the analogy is in this case a very good conclusion.

5[114] How far from the Greeks one must be to ascribe to them the stupid autochthony of Ottfried Müller! How Christian, to hold with Welcker that the Greeks were originally monotheists! How classicists torment themselves with the question whether Homer could write without grasping the much more important principle that Greek art exhibited a long inward hostility to writing and did not want to be read.

5[115] The Greeks were monstrously given to the passion for fabulizing. Even in daily life it was difficult for them to hold aloof from the "mythical," from giddiness; similarly every poetic people has a passion for lying, along with the innocence that passion requires. The neighboring peoples found this quite maddening.

5[116] To live on mountains, to travel a lot, to move about quickly—in this we can now compare ourselves with the Greek gods. We know the past too, and we nearly know the future. What would a Greek say, if he could see us!—

5[117] The gods make men even *worse*: this is human nature. If we dislike a man, we want him to be worse, and then we rejoice in the fact. This is part of the dark philosophy of hate, which has not yet been written because it is everywhere the *pudendum*, which everybody feels.

5[118] The Panhellenic Homer delights in the frivolity of the gods; but it is amazing how he can give them back their dignity. But this immense power of elevation—this is Greek!

5[119] *Thucydides* on the *state*.

The *tyrannical* element strongly cultivated in every aristocrat; this is revealed in prayers (Xenophon, Socrates). They held each other mutually within limits; the people kept everybody within limits, as far as they could.

5[120] What is the origin of the *envy of the gods*? The Greeks do not believe in calm, tranquil happiness, but in a happiness that is arrogant. Cheerfulness must have been an unbearable sight to the Greeks; their feelings are all too easily wounded; it exasperated them to see a happy man. That is *Greek*. When a man of exceptional talent appeared, the number of jealous people must have been enormous. If calamity struck him, people said, "Aha. He was too arrogant." And every one of them would have behaved just the same, had he been similarly gifted; and every one of them would gladly have played the part of the god who sends the calamity.

5[121] The Greek gods required no conversions and were generally not so tiresome and importunate. On the other hand, it was also possible to take them seriously and believe in them. Moreover, the Greek character was already ripe in the Homeric age: frivolity in images and imagination is necessary to calm and liberate that excessively passionate temperament.

If the Greeks let their intellect speak, how bitter and cruel their life appears! They don't deceive themselves. But they veil life with lies; Simonides counsels them to take life as a game; seriousness they knew too well in the form of pain. Human suffering is a delight to the gods, when they hear songs on the subject. This the Greeks knew, that only through art can even suffering become delight; *vide tragoediam*.

5[122] The really scholarly people, the literary people, are the Egyptians, not the Greeks. What looks like learning among the Greeks originated among the Egyptians, and later returned home to blend its waters with the old current. Alexandrian culture is a blend of Hellenic and Egyptian. And if the modern world associates itself with Alexandrian culture, then . . .

5[123] The *seer* must be kind, or he will have no credit among men: Cassandra.

5[124] Classical philology is the source of the shallowest enlightenment; always employed dishonestly, it has gradually become utterly ineffective. Its effect is simply another of modern man's illusions. Actually it is a matter only of a class of teachers which is not composed of priests. For this reason the state is interested in it.

It has completely exhausted its usefulness, whereas, for example, the history of Christianity still shows its own power.

5[125] Nothing can be learned from talk about philology, when it comes from philologists. It is the purest rubbish; for example, Jahn's *Bedeutung und Stellung der Altertumsstudien in Deutschland*. Utterly no feeling for what should be justified, what should be defended. This is the way people talk who have never even imagined they could be attacked.

5[126] It is simply not true that the Greeks looked only to this life. They also suffered the terror of death and hell. But no repentance and contrition.

5[127] "Wanton, mutual destruction, inevitable so long as a single *polis* wanted to live; its envy of all superiority; its greed; its moral confusion; enslavement of women; its unscrupulousness about oaths, about murder and manslaughter." B[urckhardt].

5[128] Tremendous power of self-conquest, e.g., in the citizen, in Socrates, who was capable of any evil.

5[129] In the average Greek we encounter the qualities of the genius who lacks genius—in short, all the most dangerous qualities of spirit and character.

5[130] The "sufferer" is Hellenic. Prometheus, Heracles.

The *myth of the hero* became *Panhellenic*; obviously this was the work of a poet.

5[131] *Wagner* develops man's inward imagination; later generations will be spectators of the visual arts. Poetry *must* precede the plastic arts.

5[132] "Classical education!" What do people see in it? Something quite useless—except for getting exemption from military service and taking a doctorate!

5[133] The existence of a profession of philologists—to perceive this as a problem.

5[134] *Wagner* values his art much too highly to hide himself in a corner like Schumann. Either he surrenders to the audience (*Rienzi*) or it surrenders to him. He raises it to his level. Minor artists want an audience too, but they seek it by non-artistic means, such as the press, Hanslick, etc.

5[135] When *philologists* discuss their discipline, they never reach the *roots of the matter*: they never adduce philology as a problem. Bad conscience? Or mindlessness?

5[136] It is "enlightenment" and Alexandrian culture—in the best of cases—that philologists want. Not Hellenism.

5[137] The *consistency* which is praised in a scholar is pedantry when applied to the Greeks.

5[138] Classical education! Yes, if only there were at least as much paganism in it as Goethe found and praised in Winckelmann—it would be none too much. But now, combined with or adulterated by the whole false Christianity of our age—this is too much for me, and I must relieve myself by expressing my disgust once and for all. —People really believe in magic in regard to this "classical education." Naturally, however, those who most

possess antiquity ought to possess this culture most—that is, the classicists. But *what* is classical about them?

5[139] Men used to attribute their temptations and desires to the devil or to evil spirits; nowadays this seems a fairy story. By the same token it will be a fairy story to thank a god for one's good impulses and successes. Both are alleviations; we make things more comfortable that way. To demonstrate how, in religion, every pain has been taken for the sake of *comfort* above all: evasions and excuses ready to hand!

5[140] Five years of silence. Scholar, tutor, educator.

5[141] *What is talent? —To will a lofty purpose and the means to accomplish it.*

5[142] Classical scholars are men who exploit the hollow feeling of personal inadequacy in modern man in order to earn their living.

I know them—I'm one of them myself.

5[143] The German scholars and so-called thinkers, although remote from real history, have made history their theme and, like born theologians, have tried to prove its rationality. I fear that a later age will recognize in this German contribution to European culture the most miserable of dowries: their history is false!

5[144] We treat our young as though they were educated, mature men when we introduce them to the Greeks. *What*, after all, in the Greek character is especially suited to the young? In the end we go on emphasizing *formal matters* and *details*. Are considerations of this sort suited to young people? —

Of course we offer young people the best, the loftiest, most comprehensive view of the ancients. Or don't we? The *reading* of the ancients has been emphasized in this way.

I believe that the study of antiquity has been assigned to the *wrong* stage in life. At the end of our twenties things begin to dawn on us.

5[145] All the difficulties of historical study to be *clarified* by means of the most striking example.

To what extent young people are unsuited to the Greeks.

Consequences of philology:

Arrogant expectations

Philistinism

Superficiality

Overrating of reading and writing

Alienation from the people and the needs of the people.

The philologists themselves, the historians, the philosophers, and jurists are all steeped in this nonsense.

Young people should be taught *real* disciplines.

Similarly, real art.

Then, at a riper age, they will crave *real* history too.

Philologist: his origin in general and his origin now.

The young and the philologist.

The consequences of philology.

Task of philology: to disappear.

No humanitarianism: absent even in *Antigone*, even in Goethe's *Iphigenie*.

Absence of *enlightenment*.

Politics incomprehensible to the young.

The poetic—a bad expectation.

5[146] *Critique of Development*

False assumption of a *natural* development.

Degeneration lies behind *every* great manifestation here; in any instant the beginning of the end is visible.

Degeneration lies in the facile imitation and outward understanding of great models. That is, the model provokes vainer natures to imitate and reproduce or surpass it.

The link between a genius and others is seldom a straight line. Thus between Aeschylus and Sophocles there is none at all. *After* Aeschylus numerous routes of development lay open; Sophocles took *one* of them.

The fatal quality in all great talents: they sweep everything away with them and make a desert around themselves—like Rome in the midst of her own wilderness. Great energies, still in an embryonic state, are in this way suffocated.

To be noted: how *prevalent* decadence is, even in Hellas; how rare and transient greatness is; how inadequately (on the false side) it is evaluated.

How awkward must have been the beginnings of tragedy in Thespis! That is to say, the artistic imitation of primitive orgies. So too prose, in relation to real speech, is extremely awkward.

The dangers are delighting in content or being indifferent to content and hankering for the sensual charms of the sound, etc.

The agonistic element is also the danger in every development; it overstimulates the creative impulse. —The most fortunate event in development: when several men of genius mutually limit themselves.

Isn't it likely that a great many glorious possibilities were nipped in the bud? Who could have imagined the possibility of a Theocritus at the time, unless he had actually lived?

The greatest fact remains always the precociously panhellenic HOMER. All good things derive from him; yet at the same time he remained the mightiest obstacle of all. He made everyone else superficial, and this is why the really serious spirits struggled against him. But to no avail. Homer always won.

The destructive element in great spiritual forces is also visible here. But what a difference between Homer and the Bible as such a force!

The delight in drunkenness, delight in cunning, in revenge, in envy, in slander, in obscenity—in everything which was *recognized* by the Greeks as human and therefore built into the structure of society and custom. The wisdom of their institutions lies in the lack of any gulf between good and evil, black and white. Nature, as it reveals itself, is not denied but only *ordered*, limited to specified days and religious cults. This is the root of all spiritual freedom in the ancient world; the ancients sought a moderate release of natural forces, not their destruction and denial. —The systematic elaboration of this new order becomes the *state*. It was founded not on limited individuals but on the recurrent human traits; manifest in its foundation are that *keenness of observation* and that *feeling for facts*—above all for the typical fact—which equipped the Greeks for science, history, geography, etc. Where did the Greeks acquire this freedom? From Homer to be sure. But where did Homer acquire it? —Poets are not the wisest and most logical of creatures, but they delight in particular reality of every sort; and they want, not to deny this reality, but to moderate it so that it doesn't destroy everything.

5[147] The necessity of release, of *κάθαρσις*, a fundamental principle of the Greek nature.

Alternate building-up and release, in powerful, periodic outbursts. Is there an explanation of *tragedy* here?

5[148] Philosophical minds must someday get busy and provide a final reckoning of antiquity. Once that is accomplished, antiquity will be superseded. With all the weaknesses which afflict us, we are much too dependent on the ancient world to go on treating it so leniently. Mankind's most monstrous crime—making Christianity possible—is the *fault* of the ancient world. With the passing of Christianity, antiquity too will be swept away. —It is very close to us now, certainly too close to do it justice. It has been used for oppression in the most atrocious

manner, and, under the mask of "culture," it has supported religious oppression. The crowning joke was the statement that "Antiquity has been overcome by Christianity!" This was an *historical* fact, and this is why the study of antiquity became innocuous. It is so plausible in any case to find Christian ethics "more profound" than Socrates! We are a match for Plato any day! It is all a rechewing of the same battle that was fought out in the first centuries A.D. Except that now the ancient world, once so clearly visible, has been replaced by the palest spectre, and Christianity too has clearly become a very spectral affair. It is a skirmish after the decisive battle, an aftershock. Finally, all those forces which composed the ancient world have now surfaced in their crudest form. Not a new phenomenon, and extraordinary only in its scale.

5[149] Agh, it's a miserable history, the history of classical philology! The most nauseating erudition; slothful, passive indifference; timid submission. —Who has ever shown the slightest freedom?

5[150] Religious cult must be traced back to the act of *bribing* or *begging* the god's favor. What matters is to know when their disfavor is feared. —Consequently, when a man is unable or unwilling to achieve success *by means of his own powers*, he looks for supernatural forces—that is, to *alleviate the pain of living*. When a man is *unable* or *unwilling* to make amends for something *by his own action*, he implores the gods for grace and pardon in order to *lighten his burdened conscience*. The gods were invented for the *convenience* of men. Finally also their cults as the sum-total of all *recreation* and *diversion*.

Do away with the gods, and all burdens become heavier, and there is much less cheerfulness. —Wherever the Olympians receded in importance, Greek life became darker. —Wherever we expend our labors and *investigate*,

there the Greeks celebrate festivals. They are the *celebrators of festivals*.

They do not, like the Jews, see the gods as masters over them and themselves as slaves. Theirs is the notion of a happier and more powerful social class, an image of the most successful specimens of their own class; that is, an ideal which is not opposed to their own nature. They feel themselves completely akin to it. There is also a mutual self-interest, a kind of symmarchy. When men invent gods like this, they think *nobly* of themselves. And for this reason even the bribing and begging of divine favor have something *noble* about them. The relationship is like that between a lower and a higher nobility. The Romans, on the other hand, have a genuine peasant religion, terrified of goblins and ghosts.

5[151] I want to make myself master of literature so that I can, for instance, compare:

the ἀνὰ γένος

the prologues in drama, etc.

5[152] *Outline for 18 Lectures*

9. *Honors* in cities, among rulers, at festivals, sacrifices, etc. Tyrannies.
18. *Kinds of death*.
10. *Groups of associates*, of the same aspiration.
11. *Diffusion by discipleship*.
12. *Rebellious disciples*.
6. *Non-Greeks* and Greeks, geographical participation.
7. *Slaves* and those *at the very bottom*.
8. *Very noble people*.
13. *Personal enmities*, contests.
17. *Influence on the state* and remaining aloof.
14. *Keeping silence*.
15. *Disparagement* and incomprehension of the past.
16. *Diffusion by means of lectures, travel, books, libraries*.
2. *What we have lost*, the size of our loss, the reasons for it.

5. *Art for everybody* and art for a restricted circle.
3. *Several principles* for the study of literature.
1. *Critique of development*, absolute value.
4. *Falsifications*. Literary-historical mythology.

5[153] A ruler is always a caricature, something excessive; and if a people still needs a ruler, this is a proof that the political instinct of individuals is still too weak. The man who has known better days thinks with aversion of having to gaze steadily upward, and with sorrow on those who must affect to look at things "from above."

5[154] When I see how all countries are now promoting classical education, I say, "How innocuous it must be!" And then, "How profitable it must be!" It wins these countries the glory of promoting "the liberal arts." But one has only to look at the classicists to judge the real value of these "liberal arts."

5[155] In *religious cult* is preserved an *earlier* stage of culture—that is, vestigial survivals. The ages that celebrate the rite are not those that invent it. The contrast is often very vivid. Greek ritual takes us back to a pre-Homeric outlook and culture; it is almost the oldest thing we know of the Greeks, older than the mythology which, in the form we know it, has been substantially reshaped by the poets. —*Can* this cult be called *Greek*? I doubt it. The Greeks are refiners, not inventors. They *preserve* through the beauty of their refinement.

5[156] What forever *separates us* from *ancient culture* is that its *foundations* have for us become completely *rotten*. In this respect a criticism of the Greeks is at the same time a criticism of Christianity, since they are both based on the same belief in spirits, religious ritual, and the magical order of Nature. —Today there are still numerous *vestigial* steps remaining, but these are already on the point of *collapse*.

This would be a real thesis: to describe the irreparable loss of the Greek world, and of Christianity along with it, and the foundations on which our own society and politics have until now been built.

5[157] Thesis: the *death of ancient culture* inevitable. Greek culture should be characterized as the model, and it should be shown how all culture is based upon concepts which are collapsing.

Dangerous importance of *art*: as caretaker and energizer of dead and dying concepts: also of *history*, insofar as it wants to lead us back to feelings we have outgrown. To feel "historically," to "be just to the past" is possible only if we are at the same time above and *beyond* it. But the danger in the empathy required here is great: let the dead bury their dead, lest we ourselves take the stink of decay.

5[158] *The Death of Ancient Culture*

1. Meaning of classical studies until now, obscure, dishonest.
2. As soon as they recognize their goal, they sentence themselves to death; for their goal is to describe ancient culture as a culture to be destroyed.
3. Compilation of all the ideas from which Hellenic culture arose. Critique of religion, art, society, state, morality.
4. Christian culture is thereby also rejected.
5. Art and history—dangerous.
6. Classical studies, which have become useless for educating the young, to be replaced.

Thus the problem of the discipline of *history* is resolved, and history itself becomes superfluous, once the whole internally consistent circle of past aspirations has been *condemned*. Its place must be taken by the scholarship of the *future*.

5[159] The *teacher of reading-and-writing*, and the *proofreader*, are the prototypes of the philologist.

5[160] Our classicists are to real educators as primitive medicine-men are to real doctors. Imagine the astonishment of posterity!

5[161] *Everything, with critique*

2. Literature.
2. Religious conceptions.
2. Moral conceptions.
1. Education.
1. Relationships of sex, of country, etc., of class.
2. State.
1. Art of speech, concept of civilized and uncivilized.
2. Philosophy and science.
1. On classical philology and antiquity in the modern world.
1. On Greeks and Romans.

After five and a half years, that is, from Autumn, 1875 to Easter, 1881. Easter, '82 plus $7\frac{1}{2}$ == mid 1889, e.g., at age 45-46.

5[162] Poets are naturally old-fashioned and a bridge to very remote ages; they are really always epigones. But are they necessary? The same reproach can be brought against them as against religion, that they provide *temporary comfort* and are palliatives of a sort. They keep men from working for real improvement, since they reduce and divert the passion of dissatisfaction.

5[163] The *devices* which men employ *against pain* are often *opiates* of a sort. Art and religion belong to the opiates of representation. They harmonize and soothe; they are part of a phase of *lower medicine* for psychic

suffering. *Elimination of the cause of suffering* by means of a *pretense*; that is, when a child dies, by pretending that he is still alive, fairer than before, and that we shall someday be reunited. This, with its consolation, is what the poor man's religion must be.

Is tragedy still possible for the man who doesn't believe in a metaphysical world? It must be shown how even the *highest peak* of human achievement arose on the basis of this lower medicine.

5[164] We look back over a considerable span of mankind: what sort of humanity will it be that someday looks back on us from a like distance and finds us still wholly submerged in the wreckage of the ancient culture? A humanity that finds its only consolation in "being and doing good" and spurns all other consolations? —Does beauty also come from the ancient culture? I believe that our *ugliness* depends on our own metaphysical wreckage; the cause is our moral confusion, the misery of our marriages, etc. The beautiful man—the healthy, temperate, and enterprising man—makes the world around him beautiful, in his own image.

5[165] In the nature and cult of the Greek gods all the signs of a dark, primitive, and very ancient condition are visible; had the Greeks remained in that condition, they would have become something very different. *Homer* liberated them by means of the characteristic frivolity of his gods. The transformation of a savage and gloomy religion into Homeric religion is surely the *greatest of events*. Observe, however, the cross-currents, the manifestation of old forms, the adoption of kindred foreign conceptions.

1. Primitive and gloomy prehistory. Fetishism. Human sacrifice, etc. Dread of death and worship of death.
2. Cult spectacles.
3. Later, stirrings and revivals of the gloomy primitive religion.

4. Lightening and frivolity of religion. The Ionian poets.
5. Religion as an opiate against pain and the hardships of life.
6. Poetic invention and interpretation of myth; blending and reconciling.
7. Disbelief.
8. Art as a generally retrogressive force, opposed to enlightenment.
9. The state seeks to base itself on the religious factor. Society too.
10. Religion designed to amuse the people and keep them from misery and boredom.

Cult

1. Prayer. (Curse, oath.)
2. Sacrifice.
3. Ecstasy and its means. Prophecy. Oracles. Exorcism. Magic. The priest.
4. Orientation. Form of the temple.
5. Purification. (Mysteries.)
6. Complex forms: festivals with spectacles.
 - a) state cults
 - b) family cults
 - c) domestic cults
 - d) cults of the dead

5[166]

On Religion

1. Love is the device employed by Christian ambiguity. (Sexual love in the ancient world purely conceived in Empedocles.)
2. Christian love based on denial.
3. Christian activity contrasted with Buddhistic calm.
4. No room for a religion of vengeance and righteousness! The Jews, the *most evil* people.
5. Imported ideas: dying in another's place.
6. The priestly state. Hypocrisy. Aversion to coping seriously with all problems. (Ritual sacrifice, compelling the gods.)

7. The greatest sin against the human mind is historical Christianity.
8. God entirely superfluous.
9. Decline of humanity: nothing eternal.
10. Contemptible nature of all motives; impurity of thought; delusions of all types, classes, aspirations.
11. To live wholly ruled by illusions or to live in the hard way, without hope, without deception, without providences, without redemptions and immortalities; but with a look of compassionate love toward oneself. Gulf between two views of the world, the everyday view and that of the rarest moments of thought and feeling. (Contempt and love, understanding and feeling, equally intense.) This conception of religion requires knowledge (as an instrument for the contemptuous understanding of the weaknesses and purposelessness of men). The greater the knowledge of the world, the greater that understanding. —The struggle with necessity: that is a principle of life. Understanding of the delusiveness of all goals and compassion toward oneself: that is another.

5[167] To *surpass* Greek culture by action—that is the task. But to do that, we must first know it. There is a learned thoroughness which is only an excuse for not acting. Consider how much Goethe understood of the ancient world; certainly less than a classicist, and yet enough to grapple with it creatively. One *should not* know more of a thing than he could also create. Moreover, the only means of really *knowing* something is by trying to *do* it. Try to live classically—by so doing one immediately comes a hundred miles closer to the classics than with all the erudition in the world. —Our classicists never show that they *emulate* antiquity in any such way—hence *their* antiquity has no effect on their students.

Curriculum of competition (Renaissance, Goethe) and *curriculum of desperation!*

5[168] A correctly emended author is *not very important*.

5[169] The mistaken notion of how we should concern ourselves with the classics is an obstacle even to the best.

5[170] Someday scholarly work will perhaps be performed by women; men should become intellectually creative: states, laws, works of art, etc.

5[171] The student should study an *exemplary* antiquity in precisely the same way he studies an *exemplary* man: that is, imitating as much of it as he understands and, when the model is very remote, pondering his steps and preparations, and *devising* proximate approaches.

The criterion of the curriculum is this: we should study *only what incites us to imitation, what* we understand with love and which demands to be passed on. The *most appropriate* would be a *progressive* syllabus of *exemplary models, suited to boys, young men, and older men*.

5[172] *This* is how Goethe took possession of the ancient world: always with a competitive soul. But who else? There is no sign of a carefully considered pedagogy of this sort. Does anyone know that there is a knowledge of the ancient world which cannot be imparted to the young?

5[173] The *puerile* character of classical philology: invented by teachers for their students.

5[174] Ever *more general* form of the *exemplary model*: first men, then institutions, and finally trends, goals, or absence of goals.

Highest form: *supersession of the model* by a reverse process from trends to institutions, from institutions to men.

5[175] The *advancement of learning at the expense of man* is the most destructive thing in the world. The stunted man is a backward step for humanity; he casts his shadow over every age. It debases conviction, the natural purpose of the particular field of knowledge; knowledge itself is finally destroyed thereby. It is advanced to be sure, but its effect on life is nil or immoral.

5[176] Men are not to be exploited like *things*!

5[177] Out of the very imperfect philology and classical scholarship [of the Renaissance], there issued a stream of freedom. Our own highly developed classical scholarship enslaves men and serves the idols of the state.

5[178] The better the state is organized, the more apathetic mankind will be.

To make the individual *uncomfortable*: my mission!

Appeal of liberating the individual in struggle!

Intellectual achievement has its *age* in history; for this, hereditary energy is needed. In the ideal state such energy vanishes.

5[179] The intellectual culture of Greece a perversion of the boundless political instinct for *ἀριστεῖν*. The *πόλις* adamantly opposed to new culture. *Despite this*, culture existed.

5[180] Supreme judgment on life only to be passed by the supreme energy of life. The mind must be utterly removed from *apathy*.

In the *transitional* period of world history the judgment will be most accurate, since it is then that the greatest geniuses exist.

Production of the genius as the only one who can really *value* and *deny* life.

5[181] Walter Scott loved company because he loved to tell stories; he practised at it the way a virtuoso practices his piano for seven hours straight.

5[182] *Save your genius!* should be proclaimed to the people. Free him! Do everything to unshackle him!

5[183] The feeble, the poor in spirit, have no *right* to pass judgment on life.

5[184] When good friends, etc., praise me, politeness and good feelings make me look pleased and grateful; but actually I am quite indifferent. My essential being is utterly inert in this regard and cannot be budged a step from the sun or shade in which it lies. —But men want to please by their praise, and they would be offended unless one took pleasure in it.

5[185] We must not expect of mankind's future what certain past epochs have achieved, e.g., the effects of religious feeling. Perhaps the saint as a type is only possible given a certain bias of intellect, which is today gone. Perhaps even *loftiness* of intellect has been reserved for an age of mankind. Boundless energy of the will, transferred (aberration) to intellectual aspirations—only possible so long as that savagery and energy were generally

cultivated. Humanity probably comes closer to its goal at the middle of its journey than at the end. —Certain powers, by which art is conditioned, could become extinct, e.g., the pleasure in lying, in ambiguity, symbolism, etc.; drunkenness might also become disreputable. And actually: once life is ordered in an ideal state, then there can no longer be a poetry of the present; at best poetry will look back with longing to the time when the state was not ideal.

5[186] Infancy and childhood have their ends in themselves; they are not *phases*.

5[187] I would like to write a book on the scholar's way of life.

5[188] *Aims*

The value of life can be measured only by the *highest intellect* and the warmest heart.

How can the highest intelligence be produced?—

Aims of producing *human welfare* are in general wholly *different* from those of producing the highest intelligence. Welfare is over-valued and is understood in a completely superficial way; so too are the school and education.

The ideal state, of which the socialists dream, destroys the foundation of great intelligence, of violent energy.

We must want life to maintain its *violent* character in order that *savage* powers and energies should be called into existence. The judgment on the value of life is the supreme result of the most violent *tension* in chaos.

But the warmest heart wants to eliminate that powerful, savage quality—even though it sprang from that same quality! It wants to eliminate its own foundations. That is, it is not intelligent!

The highest intelligence and the warmest heart cannot coexist in the same person. The highest intelligence

is *superior* to any other good. Besides, this other good is merely an item appraised in the overall reckoning of life; the wise man stands higher than it.

The *wise man* must oppose the designs of the unintelligent good, since his goal is the reproduction of his type. Least of all can he *promote* the ideal state. —Christ promoted the stupidity of men; he arrested the production of great intellect. Quite consistently! His opposite would perhaps be an obstacle to the production of more Christs. —*Fatum tristissimum generis humani!*

5[189] *Proemium*

If I were *free* now, all these struggles of mine would be unnecessary; instead, I could turn to a work or an action and test all my strength against it. —Now I can only hope to become free by gradual stages; and to date I feel I am becoming more so. By so doing the day of my real *labor* will also come, and the *preparation* for the Olympic games will be over.—

5[190] The time is at hand when I shall have to reveal opinions which are regarded as *shameful* to the person cherishing them; then even acquaintances and friends will become skittish and apprehensive. I too must pass through this fire. Then I shall belong to myself more than ever.—

5[191] A man who learned how to produce genius and wished to practice the method employed by Nature, would have to be as malevolent and unfeeling as Nature herself.

5[192] I find Xenophon's *Memorabilia* very interesting. The example of Socrates must still be recognized: it is still immediately imitable. The ἀνδραποδιῖται ἐαυτῶν pierce me.

5[193] Plato's Socrates is in a very real sense a caricature, an excessive Socrates.

5[194] Abuse men, push them to extremes, and keep this up for thousands of years—and suddenly, because of an *aberration* of nature, because of a spark set flying from the terrible energy thereby ignited, the genius appears! —This is what history tells me. Horrible vision! Ah, I cannot endure you!—

5[195] The *Greeks* of the *Roman Empire* are apathetic and provide an excellent idea of future humanity. They appear to be men of good will, especially toward Rome: they loathe gladiatorial games, etc. —It is wholly wrong to infer from this what they were like in their youthful days.

5[196] *Homer* is so much at home in the humanized world of the gods and as a poet takes such pleasure in it, that he must have been profoundly irreligious. His relation to his gods is like a sculptor's toward his clay and marble.

5[197] The Greek *polis* tends to exclude intellectual development; its political instinct was on this side extremely paralyzing and conservative. There could be no *history*, no *becoming*, in culture; everything had to be fixed for all time. Later even Plato felt the same way. *Despite* the *polis*, intellectual culture arose; indirectly the *polis* was a cause of this, since through it the individual's ambition was raised to the highest pitch. If a Greek set out to distinguish himself intellectually, he went to the ultimate limits.

5[198] *The earliest inhabitants* of Greek soil: a people of Mongolian origin, worshipping trees and snakes. A

fringe of Semites along the coast. Here and there, Thracians. The Greeks welcomed into their own bloodstream all these elements; they also took their gods and myths (several of the Odysseus stories are Mongolian). The Dorian invasion is a *later thrust*; all of Greece had been gradually overwhelmed before the Dorians arrived. What are “racially pure” Greeks? Can’t we simply suppose that Italic peoples, mixed with Thracian and Semitic elements, became *Greeks*?

5[199] Considering the vast horde of slaves on the mainland, the *Greeks* must always have been numerically very few. A *ruling* class of leisured people, politicians, etc. Their *enmities* kept them in a state of physical and intellectual tension. They had to maintain their qualitative superiority—that was their spell over the masses.

5[200] *Pericles’ [funeral] speech* is a great optimistic illusion, the sunset in which the bad day is forgotten—and then it is suddenly night!

[6 == U II 8c. Summer? 1875.]

6[1] *Imitation* of antiquity.

The means, classical philology, makes the imitation impossible for the philologist. Knowing without knowing how.

Therefore: either it becomes purely historical—
or philology ceases to exist (Schiller).

Even the historical knowledge of antiquity is mediated by means of reproduction, imitation.

Goethe’s Hellenism (Greek *σωφροσύνη* in art transferred to the moral man).

6[2] Greek antiquity as a classical archive of examples for the enlightenment of our entire culture and its development. It is a means for *understanding ourselves*, for judging our own age and thereby surpassing it.

The pessimistic basis of our culture.

6[3] Socrates—I simply admit it—is so close to me that I almost always find myself in conflict with him.

6[4] *Conflict of Science and Wisdom*

Science (N.B. *before* it becomes habit and instinct) appears:

1) When the gods are not regarded as good. Great advantage in recognizing a thing as *certain*.

2) When egoism pushes the individual—in certain activities, e.g. shipping—to seek his own advantage by means of science.

3) As something for aristocratic people, who have leisure. Curiosity.

4) When, given the wild veering of public opinion, the individual wants a firmer footing.

In what respect does this impulse toward science differ from the general instinct to learn and acquire something? Only by a lesser degree of egoism or a further intensification of it. *On one side*, a losing of oneself in things; *on the other*, an egoism that transcends the individual.

Wisdom manifests itself:

- 1) in non-logical generalization and rapidity in reaching its destination.
- 2) in referring these results to life.
- 3) in the boundless importance which is ascribed to the individual soul. One thing is necessary.

Socratism is: *first*: wisdom in taking the soul seriously.

second: science, as fear and hatred of non-logical generalization.

third: something unique, because it requires conduct that is aware and logically correct.

The result is damage to science and the ethical life.

6[5] Conflict between science and wisdom is portrayed in the older philosophers.

- 6[6] 1) How is the world colored among these older Greeks?
2) How are they related to the non-philosophers?
3) Their *personalities* are important; in the effort to divine them is the meaning of my study of their lives.
4) Conflict of science and wisdom in them.
5) Ironic story: everything is false. Man as it were clinging to a beam.

6[7] This history can also be told in an *ironic* and *sorrowful* way. In any case I propose to shun the uniformly serious tone.

Socrates *overturned everything* at the moment when, *for the most part*, they were very close to the truth. This is particularly *ironic*.

To depict everything against the mythical background. Boundless uncertainty of myth, its fluctuation. Something more certain is wanted.

Only where touched by the rays of myth is Greek life radiant; elsewhere it is dark. And now the philosophers divest themselves of myth; how can they endure in this darkness?—

The individual who wants to rely *on himself*. *For this are needed supreme knowledge*, philosophy. Other men have need of a science that is slowly growing up.

Or rather: they need to believe that they possess such supreme knowledge. The kind of belief in their own knowledge which the Greeks possessed will never be possible again. But they were unaware of the difficulty and danger of knowledge. They had an indestructible belief in themselves by means of which they overcame all their neighbors and predecessors. The world has never known such bliss in the possession of the truth; nor such harsh-

ness, arrogance, and tyrannical temper. In his secret desires every Greek was a tyrant; and, generally speaking, everyone who could become a tyrant, did so—with the possible exception of Solon, to judge from his own poetry.

Even the independence is only apparent; in point of fact, each one was linked to his predecessor. Semblances linked to semblances. It is comic to take all this too seriously.

The whole older philosophy as a curious labyrinth of reason. One has to strike a tone appropriate to dream and fable.

6[8] *Aristotle in his esthetic judgment*
 against Empedocles
 with regard to tragedy
 Demosthenes
 Thucydides
 figurative art
 music

6[9] The development of Greek *music* and *philosophy* lies along parallel lines. Comparison of both, insofar as both provide evidence about the nature of the Greeks. Music, of course, is only known to us as a residue of lyric.

Empedocles—tragedy	religious monody
Heraclitus—Archilochus	Xenophanes as symposiast
Democritus—Anacreon	
Pythagoras—Pindar	
Anaxagoras—Simonides	
(All comparison of persons is lopsided and silly)	

6[10] The various *philosophies* are, in respect to Greek life, *shades of Hades*: they reflect it but as it were through a cloud of smoke.

Such men must be very closely followed until they

can be recreated by a poet: the integrating imagination of many must labor at it.

They are too rare to be permitted to escape. How little can be achieved by criticism, by twisting and squeezing every shred of information!

6[11] *Introduction:*

Chapter 1. Comparison of the older Greek philosophers with the post-Socratic philosophical schools.

Chapter 2. Chronology of the older philosophers.

Exposition:

The development of Greek culture is indispensable because our entire Western culture arose from it. Fate willed that late and decadent Greece should have the greatest historical influence. Moreover, archaic Greece has always been wrongly judged. Need for accurate knowledge of late Greece in order to distinguish it from the earlier period.

There are also a great many possibilities which have not yet been discovered, since the Greeks did not discover them. Other possibilities were *revealed* by the Greeks, and later *concealed*.

6[12] These philosophers demonstrate *what dangers Greek culture contained in itself:*

myth as a featherbed of thought	—as against cold abstraction and rigorous science.
life of effeminate com- fort	—as against frugality, rigorous ascetic view in Pythagoras, Empedocles, and Anaximan- der.
cruelty in battle and strife	—as against Empedocles with his reform of sacrifice.
lying and deception	—as against enthusiasm for the truth, whatever the con- sequences.
adaptability, excessive sociability	—as against Heraclitus' haugh- tiness and solitude.

6[13] These philosophers demonstrate the vital force of that culture which is capable of producing its own correctives.

How did this age die? Unnaturally? Where then do the seeds of its decadence lie?

The *withdrawal from the world by the best men* was a great disaster. From Socrates on, the individual suddenly considers himself too important.

For Athens, we must add the *plague*.

The *cause* lies also in the Persian Wars. The danger was too great, and the victory too extraordinary.

Death of the great musical lyric and of philosophy.

Socrates is the revenge for Thersites. The glorious Achilles, angered by the words of the ugly commoner Thersites at the death of Penthesilea, struck him down and killed him; the ugly commoner Socrates struck down and destroyed the *authority* of glorious myth in Greece.

6[14] The older Greek philosophy is the philosophy of *genuine statesmen*. How pitiful are our statesmen in comparison! For the most part, the same gulf also separates the pre-Socratics from the post-Socratics.

Among the earlier philosophers there is none of that "horrid pretense to happiness" that exists from Socrates on. Nor does everything revolve around their state of mind, since one cannot think about that state without danger. Later on Apollo's γνῶθι σαυτόν was misunderstood.

Moreover, they were not given to *chatter* and *insult*; and they didn't *write*.

Hellenism weakened, Romanized, coarsened, turned decorative; then welcomed as decorative culture into alliance by a weakened Christianity, and diffused by force among uncivilized peoples—that is the history of Western civilization. Then *prestol!*—and the Greeks and the priests are reconciled.

I want to put Schopenhauer, Wagner, and the older Greeks together: this provides a prospect of a glorious culture.

6[15] *Comparison* of the older philosophy with the pre-Socratics.

1) The older philosophy is related to art; its solution to the problems of the world was repeatedly inspired by *art*. Spirit of music and figurative art.

2) It is *not* the negation of *ordinary* life, but as it were a rare flower *growing* from it. It expresses the secrets of that other life. (Theory—practice.)

3) It is not so individualistic and happiness-oriented; it lacks the horrid pretense to happiness.

4) These older philosophers possess a higher wisdom in their own lives, not cold and clever moral virtue. The image of their life is richer and more complicated; the Socratics simplify and banalize.

6[16] The three phases in the history of the dithyramb:

1) Arion's dithyramb—whence archaic tragedy.

2) the agonistic dithyramb organized by the state—parallel to domestic tragedy.

3) the mimetic dithyramb, pleasantly vulgar.

6[17] Among the Greeks an *older* form is repeatedly the *higher* form, e.g., in *dithyramb* and *tragedy*. The danger for the Greeks lay in virtuosity of every kind; with Socrates begin the virtuosos of life; with Socrates, the new dithyramb, the new tragedy, the *discovery of the rhetorician*.

The *rhetorician* is a Greek discovery (!) of the later period. They have discovered the "form in itself" (and even the philosopher for it).

How is Plato's struggle against rhetoric to be understood? He *envies* its influence.

Archaic Greece revealed its power with this series of philosophers. With Socrates this revelation is *interrupted*: he attempts to *create himself* and to reject all tradition.

My general task: to show how life, philosophy, and

art can have a deeper and a congenial relation to each other, without philosophy's becoming superficial and the philosopher's life false.

It is splendid that the old philosophers could live so *freely* without thereby turning into *madmen* or *virtuosi*. The individual's freedom was immensely great.

The false contrast between *vita practica* and *vita contemplativa* is Asiatic. The Greeks understood the matter better.

6[18] These older philosophers can be portrayed as men who feel Greek air and custom as a *constraint* and a *barrier*; that is, as self-liberators (Heraclitus' struggle against Homer and Hesiod, Pythagoras against secularization, all of them against myth, especially Democritus). There is a lacuna in their nature in comparison with the Greek artist and also the statesman.

I interpret them as *precursors of a reformation* of Greek man; but not as precursors of Socrates. However, their reform was abortive; in Pythagoras it ended with a sect. In one group of events the whole of this reforming spirit is conveyed—the *development of tragedy*. The *reformer manqué* is *Empedocles*; when he failed, only Socrates remained. Hence Aristotle's hostility to Empedocles is very understandable.

Empedocles—free state—transformation of life—popular reform—attempted with the aid of the great Hellenic festivals. —

Tragedy was likewise a means. Pindar?

They have not found their philosopher and reformer. Compare Plato, who was misled by Socrates. Attempt to characterize Plato *without* Socrates. Tragedy—profound interpretation of life—pure Nature—no fanatical conversion. Clearly the Greeks were *on the point* of discovering *an even higher type* of man than the earlier type. Then the shears intervened. It lasted into the *tragic age* of the Greeks.

- 6[19] 1) Image of the Greeks in respect to their dangers and decadence.
 2) Contrasting image of currents in tragedy. New interpretation of myth.
 3) Disposition to turn reformer. Attempts to achieve a *view of life*.
 4) The decision—Socrates. *The misled Plato*.

6[20] Passion in Mimnermus; hatred of *old age*.

The deep melancholy in Pindar: human life shines only when touched by a gleam from above.

Understanding of the world *starts with suffering*: this is the tragic element in tragedy.

6[21] Thales—the unmythical.

Anaximander—Becoming and Passing Away in nature understood morally as crime and punishment.

Heraclitus—legality and justice in the world.

Parmenides—the other world behind this one; this world as a problem.

Anaxagoras—world-architect.

Empedocles—Blind Love and blind Hate; the deep irrationality in the most rational things in the world.

Democritus—the world is utterly without reason and instinct, endlessly whirled. All gods and myths useless.

Socrates—there is nobody left but myself; anxiety about ourselves becomes the soul of philosophy.

Plato's attempt to think everything through and to be the savior.

6[22] Need to describe personalities, as I have described Heraclitus. The historical material to be woven in.

6[23] Everywhere in the world *graduality* reigns; among the Greeks forward progress is swift, but back-

ward motion is also frightfully fast. Once the Hellenic genius has exhausted its highest types, the Greek declines with great rapidity. It takes only one interruption to prevent the fulfillment of the great life-forms. Suddenly, as in tragedy, everything was over. A single powerful crank, like Socrates—and the break was irremediable. In him the self-destruction of Greek man is complete. It is significant, I think, that he was a sculptor's son.

If these figurative arts could only talk, they would seem superficial to us; in Socrates, a sculptor's son, this superficiality found expression.

6[24] Men became *wittier* during the Middle Ages; the cause of this is having to reckon according to two standards, the subtleties of conscience and the exegesis of Scripture. This kind of *honing of the wit* under duress of a hierarchy and a theology was lacking in the ancient world. With the Greeks it was just the reverse; because of their great freedom of thought they were gullible and superficial. They believed in a thing arbitrarily, and they stopped believing arbitrarily. For this reason they took no pleasure in contorted cleverness—that is, in the sort of wit most preferred by the modern world. The Greeks were not very *witty*; this is why they made such an ado over Socratic irony. In this respect I often find Plato somewhat ponderous.

6[25] With Empedocles and Democritus the Greeks took the most direct route to *an accurate judgment* of human life, its irrationality, its suffering. But, thanks to Socrates, they never reached their goal. The disinterested view of man is lacking in all Socratics; their minds are full of those horrible abstractions—"the good," "the just," etc. We should read Schopenhauer and ask ourselves why the ancients lacked (necessarily lacked?) this profound and free view of things. I do not understand it. On the contrary, they lose their disinterestedness because of Socrates. Their myths and tragedies are much wiser than

the ethics of Plato and Aristotle; and their "Stoic and Epicurean" men are *poor* in comparison with their older poets and statesmen.

6[26] *Influence of Socrates:*

- 1) he destroyed the disinterestedness of the ethical judgment,
- 2) he overthrew science,
- 3) he had no feeling for art,
- 4) he tore the individual from his historical bonds,
- 5) he encouraged chatter and empty talk.

6[27] I no longer believe in the "natural development" of the Greeks; they were too talented to exist *gradually*, in that degree-by-degree manner in which stones and stupidity exist. The Persian Wars were the national disaster; the success was too great; all the bad instincts erupted; the tyrannical hunger to dominate all Hellas seized individuals and cities alike. With the domination (in spiritual fields) of Athens, a large number of powers were suffocated; one need merely recall how uncreative Athens was in philosophy for so long. An Athenian Pindar would have been impossible; Simonides makes this clear. And Empedocles would have been impossible too; and Heraclitus too. Almost all the great musicians come from elsewhere. Athenian tragedy is not the supreme form we might think it is. Its heroes are too much lacking in the Pindaric quality. Generally speaking, how horrible that war should have broken out between, of all cities, *Sparta* and *Athens*! The fact cannot be too deeply pondered. *The intellectual domination of Athens was the obstacle to the reformation of Greek man.* One need merely think back to the time when that domination did not exist. It was not necessary, and it happened only as a result of the Persian Wars, i.e., only after the actual political power was revealed. Miletus, for instance, was extremely rich in talent; so was Agrigentum.

6[28] The tyrant who can do as he pleases, i.e., the Greek who is unlimited by any power, is an utterly immoderate creature: "he overturns the customs of his own country, violates women, and kills men according to his pleasure." Equally unrestrained is the tyrannical free-thinker, of whom the Greeks were no less afraid. Hatred of kings—a sign of democratic sentiment. If a man like Empedocles could have been tyrant, a reformation would, I believe, have been possible.

In demanding a philosopher-king, Plato expresses an idea which might at one time have been possible; he had the idea when the time in which it might have been realized had passed. Periander?—

6[29] Without the tyrant Peisistratus there would have been no Athenian tragedy. Solon was opposed, but desire for it later revived. What did Peisistratus hope to achieve with this great grief-provoking spectacle?

Solon's aversion to tragedy: think of the limitation placed upon funeral expenditures, the prohibition of *threnoi*. Comment on the *μανικὸν πένθος* among the women of Miletus.

According to the anecdote, it is the make-believe element that offended Solon; in this the inartistic temper of the Athenians is revealed.

Cleisthenes, Periander, and Peisistratus the patrons of tragedy as a popular entertainment; pleasure in the *μανικὸν πένθος*. Solon desires moderation.

6[30] Centralization brought about by the Persian Wars: Sparta and Athens overwhelmed by it. By contrast the period 776-560 shows no sign of it; the culture of the *polis* flourished. I believe that the idea of centralization could have been achieved without the Persian Wars—by means of a spiritual reformation. Pythagoras?

What mattered once was the unity of festival and cult; this is where the reformation would have begun. *The idea of a panhellenic tragedy*—in such a case an infinitely

richer power would have developed. Why did this come to nothing? After Corinth, Sicyon, and Athens had developed this art?

6[31] The greatest loss that can happen to humanity is a failure to realize the highest types of life. Something of the sort happened then. A sharp parallel between this ideal and the Christian ideal. Make use of Schopenhauer's observation: "Eminent and aristocratic men very quickly take note of the education conferred by fate and obediently and gratefully submit to it; they realize that life offers instruction but not happiness, and in the end they say with Petrarch: *altro diletto, che 'mparar, non provo*. And in point of fact they manage to pursue their desires and aspirations solely for the sake of appearances and in a playful spirit, while inwardly and seriously they expect only instruction. It is this that then gives them a genial, contemplative, and sublime appearance." —*Parerga* I 439. Compare this to the *Socratics* and their pursuit of happiness!

6[32] The terrifying dialogue between the Athenians and the Melians in Thucydides! Given such sentiments, Hellenism is doomed to die—there is *terror* on all sides. E.g., as the Athenian says: "When you speak of the favor of the gods, we may as fairly hope for that as yourselves; neither our pretensions nor our conduct being in any way contrary to what men believe of the gods, or practise among themselves."

6[33] Luther: "I have no better work than passion and anger. So when I want to compose poetry, write, pray, and preach well, I have to be angry. Then my whole blood is refreshed; my intellect is sharpened, and all unpleasant ideas and temptations leave me."

6[34] It is a happy truth that, for the man whose goals in life are knowledge and becoming a better man, everything serves his purpose. But it is true only in a limited way: the man who wants knowledge is forced to undertake the most exhausting labor; the man who wants to be better is unnerved and deranged by illness. As a general rule, we can say that the apparent purposiveness in fate is the action of the individual, who directs his own life and learns from everything, as a bee sucks honey. But the fate which pertains to a nation is a matter of a complex whole—a whole which cannot, like a man, reflect on its own existence and supply itself with goals. And for this reason purposiveness among nations is the stupid invention of oversubtle minds—a fact which can be demonstrated with great ease, e.g., in the fact that an epoch in full flower is suddenly surprised by a snowstorm that blasts everything. Stupidity prevails here no less than in Nature. Up to a certain point every nation, even under the most adverse circumstances, accomplishes something that recalls its original gifts. But in order for it to achieve its *very best*, certain disasters must not occur. The Greeks failed to realize their best.

Even the Athenian achievement might have been greater had it not been for the political furor caused by the Persian Wars. Think of Aeschylus, who comes from the period before the Persian Wars and who was dissatisfied with the Athenians of his own time.

6[35] Because of the adverse situation of the Greek cities after the Persian Wars, many conditions favorable to the production and development of the great individual disappeared. Thus the production of the genius certainly depends on the fate of the nation. In fact, incipient genius is of very common occurrence, but all the conditions essential to it very rarely coincide.

This reformation of the Hellene, as I envisage it, would be a wonderful base for the production of the genius. Nothing of the kind has ever existed. It would be worth describing. Something inexpressible was lost to us at the time.

6[36] The higher *moral* nature of the Greeks is manifest in their wholeness and simplicity. Because they show us man *simplified*, they give us pleasure, as the sight of animals pleases us.

6[37] The philosopher's aspiration is to *understand* the life his fellow men merely live. Whereas philosophers interpret existence and understand its dangers on their own account, they also at the same time interpret life for their people.

6[38] *Thales' league of city-states*. He saw the disaster of the *polis* and he saw myth as the basis of the *polis*. Destroy myth, and you perhaps destroy the *polis*. Thales as statesman. Struggle against the *polis*.

Attitude of Heraclitus toward the Persians; he was clear about the danger of the Hellenic and barbarian element.
Anaximander as founder of colonies.

Parmenides as lawgiver.

Empedocles the democrat, whose shield bears the blazon of social reform.

6[39] Words are the seducers of the philosophers; they wriggle in the net of language.

6[40] *The power of the individual* in Greece is extraordinary: power to found cities, to hand down laws.

6[41] Science probes natural process, but it can never command man. Disposition, love, pleasure, pain, exaltation, exhaustion—science knows nothing of all this. Man must somehow *explain* his own life and experience to himself and, by so doing, evaluate it. Religions acquire their power from the fact that they are, in this regard, *standards of value*, criteria. An event viewed in myth is

an event viewed differently. Implicit in the interpretations offered by religion is the fact that human life is measured by a human ideal.

6[42] *Aeschylus* has lived and struggled in vain; he came too late. That is the tragic element in Greek history: the *greatest*, like Demosthenes, come too late to raise up their people.

Aeschylus vouches for a greatness in the Greek spirit, which perishes with him.

6[43] The Gospel of the tortoise is admired today—alas, the Greeks ran too swiftly. It is not happy periods I seek in history, but ages that might provide fertile ground for the *production* of the genius. At this point I discover the period that preceded the Persian Wars. We can never know this period as well as we should.

- 6[44]
1. These philosophers considered separately, in their own right.
 2. Then as witnesses of what is Greek. (Their philosophies as the Hades-shades of the Greek spirit.)
 3. Then as men who struggle against the dangers of the Hellenic nature.
 4. Then as failed reformers in the course of Greek history.
 5. Then in contrast with Socrates and the philosophers of the schools and with the *vita contemplativa*, as efforts to achieve a *life-style* which has *not yet* been achieved.

6[45] Many men live a *dramatic* life, many an *epic* life, and many a confused and inartistic life. Greek history, thanks to the Persian Wars, has a *daemon ex machina*.

6[46] In Anaxagoras: *νοῦς* is an *ἄθεος ex machina*.

6[47] Attempt at a popular culture.

A waste of very expensive Greek *mind* and Greek *blood*! Need to point out how, in this regard, men must live *more prudently*. The tyrants of the mind were in Greece almost always murdered, and their descendants are few. Other periods have demonstrated their power by thinking things through and by working out all the possibilities and consequences of a single great idea—the Christian period, for instance. But among the Greeks this hegemony of an idea was too hard to achieve; there was mutual hostility in everything. The culture of the city-state the only culture that has *proven* itself until now—we are still living on it today.

Culture of the city-state

world culture

popular culture: how weak it was among the Greeks; in reality only a less colorful version of Athenian culture.

6[48] 1. To every man there comes an hour when he asks himself in amazement, "How in the world can I live? And yet I'm alive!—an hour when he begins to grasp the fact that he possesses the same sort of ingenuity that amazes him in the plant that curls and climbs and finally wins a place in the sun and, by so doing, creates, on inhospitable ground, its share of joy. In the descriptions men give of their lives, there are always such moments—moments when we wonder at the plant's survival in barren ground and the unflinching bravery with which it sets about its task. Now there are careers in which the dangers are vastly increased, e.g., the life of the thinker. And in such cases we must listen attentively to what we are told, since it is here that we understand something of the *potentialities of life*, the mere news of which brings joy and strength and illuminates the life of men to come. In these cases everything is ingenious, sensible, auda-

cious, desperate, and hopeful, as it is perhaps in the voyages of the greatest explorers; and there is a resemblance too in actions, in explorations of the most remote and dangerous regions of human life. What is amazing in such careers is that two impulses, each straining in a different direction, are forced to submit as it were to a single yoke. The man who wants knowledge must again and again abandon the *terra firma* where men live and venture into the uncertain; and the impulse which desires life must again and again grope its way toward a more or less secure place where it can find a purchase. I am reminded of James Cook who, holding his plumb-line in his hand, groped for three months through a chain of sunken reefs; and his dangers so constantly increased that he frequently sought shelter in places he had earlier regarded as exceptionally dangerous. (Lichtenberg IV 152.) The conflict between science and wisdom becomes greater, and submission to a single yoke becomes rarer as these impulses become more powerful—that is, as life becomes fuller and more flourishing, and knowledge, on the other hand, becomes more insatiable and more eager for any adventure.

2. So I will not be satisfied with ranging before my mind a series of thinkers, each one of whom contains in himself that incomprehensibility I mentioned, and whose discovery of his own potentiality of life must arouse amazement. These are thinkers who lived in the mightiest and most fertile period of Greece, the century prior to, and during, the Persian Wars. And they discovered nothing less than *beautiful potentialities of life*; and it seems to me that the later Greeks have forgotten the best part of this. What nation to the present time can claim that it has rediscovered these potentialities? —Compare the thinkers of other periods and other peoples with that series of figures that begins with Thales and ends with Democritus; moreover, add Socrates and his students and all the heads of philosophical sects among the later Greeks, and compare them with these older Greeks. Now this is precisely what I want to do in this paper and

it is to be hoped that others will do it still better. In any case I believe that such studies will end by making readers exclaim, "How beautiful they are! I see among them no coarse and twisted figures, no priestly faces, no emaciated desert-hermits, no fanatical prettifier of contemporary things, no theologizing fraud, no pallid and oppressed students; nor do I see among them all those who assign such importance to 'the health of the soul' or the question 'What is happiness?' that they manage to neglect the world and their fellow-men." —Who could have rediscovered *these potentialities of life*? Poets and historians must brood on this problem: such men are too rare to be allowed to disappear. Rather, we should give ourselves no rest until we have recreated their portraits and painted them a hundred times on the wall—we are still a long way from this!—until then we will certainly give ourselves no peace. For our very inventive age still has not made precisely that inventive discovery which the older philosophers must have made. Otherwise, what was the source of their remarkable beauty? Where does our ugliness come from? —For what is beauty if not the reflected image—as perceived by us—of an extraordinary joy in Nature, through the discovery of a new potentiality of life? And what is ugliness except dissatisfaction with oneself, the doubt whether Nature really still understands the art of tempting to life?

3. Greek philosophy appears to begin with a nonsensical idea, with the proposition that water is the origin and womb of all things. Is it really necessary, we have to ask, to stop at this point and consider this notion seriously? —Yes, and for three reasons. First, because the proposition expresses something about the origin of things; second, because it does so without making use of images and mythical fables; and finally, third, because in it, as though in chrysalis stage, is contained the idea that everything is one. The first reason leaves Thales still in the company of religious and superstitious minds; the second removes him from that company and shows him to be the first student of Nature; in the third reason,

Thales is viewed as the first Greek philosopher. In Thales for the first time philosophical man wins out over mythical man, and the wise man once again wins out over scientific man.

6[49] How in the world was Thales able to renounce myth? Something must have happened here. The *polis* was the focal point of the Hellenic will, and it is based on myth; that is, the renunciation of myth meant renouncing the old mythical conception of the *polis*. Now we know that Thales proposed the founding of a federation of city-states, but failed to accomplish it; he foundered on the old mythical conception of the *polis*. At the same time he had a presentiment of the immense danger posed to Greece if this isolating power of the myth separated the city-states. In actual fact, had Thales realized his proposed federation, Greece would have been spared the Persian Wars, and also the Athenian victory and hegemony. All the older philosophers labored to transform the conception of the *polis* and to create Panhellenic sentiment. Heraclitus even seems to have broken down the barriers between barbarian and Greek, in order to create greater freedom and foster less parochial views. —Importance of water and the sea for the Greeks.

6[50] *Thales*: What impelled him toward science and wisdom? —But above all the struggle against myth. Against the *polis*, which is founded on it. Only means of safeguarding the Hellenic quality: to avoid the Persian Wars. Among all philosophers a Panhellenic purpose.

Anaximander: Struggle against myth insofar as it makes men effeminate and superficial and to that degree endangers the Greeks.

Heraclitus: Struggle against myth insofar as it isolates the Greeks and opposes them to the barbarians. He ponders a world-order which transcends the Greek.

Parmenides: Theoretical contempt for the world as an illusion. Struggle against the fantastic and shifting elements in the general conception of the world: he wants to give men peace in place of political passion. Lawgiver.

Anaxagoras: The world as irrational, but also orderly and beautiful: man must be the same, and this is how Anaxagoras found him among the older Athenians, Aeschylus, etc. His philosophy a mirror-image of the older Athens: lawgiver for men who do not need laws.

Empedocles: Panhellenic reformer, Pythagorean life, scientifically based. New mythology. Understanding of the irrational in both impulses, Love and Hate. Love, democracy, community of goods. Comparison with tragedy.

Democritus: The world is irrational, neither orderly nor beautiful, but only necessary. Absolute elimination of everything mythical. The world is comprehensible. He is in favor of the *polis* (instead of the Epicurean garden); it was a potentiality of Hellenic life.

Socrates: The tragic swiftness of the Greeks. The older philosophers have not influenced him. The virtuosos of life: the older philosophers always think *in the manner of Icarus*.

6[51] The Greeks have certainly never been valued too highly, because in this case they would have been valued as they deserve. But it is this which is impossible. How will we ever be able to assess them rightly? We have always judged them wrongly.

[7 === Mp XIII 6a. 1875.]

7[1] The veneration of classical antiquity as exhibited by the Italians—that is, the only serious, disinterested, devoted veneration antiquity has ever known. It is a splendid example of Don Quixotism; and so in some respect is classical philology at its best. The same can be said of the Alexandrian scholars, of the Sophists of the first and second century, of the Atticists, etc. They imitate something wholly chimerical and pursue a fabulous world that never existed. This trait pervades the whole

ancient world: the way the Homeric heroes were copied, the whole concern with myth, shows something of it. The entire Greek experience has gradually become an object of Quixotism. We cannot understand our own modern world, unless we realize the enormous influence of the purely imaginary. Opposed to this is the fact that no imitation is possible. All imitation is merely an artistic phenomenon; that is, it aims at illusion. Any living thing can acquire manners, ideas, etc., through imitation, but imitation can *create* nothing. A culture that copies Greek culture cannot create. True, the creative person can borrow from all sides and find nourishment. And so it is only as creators that we shall be able to take anything from the Greeks. But in what respect were classicists ever creators? There must be a few dirty trades, such as knacker's men; proof-readers too. Must classicists represent this sort of dirty calling?

7[2] Origin of the classicist. When a great work of art makes its appearance, it always finds a corresponding spectator who not only feels its influence but wants to immortalize it. The same applies to a great state, to everything, in short, which elevates man. In the same way classicists want to immortalize the influence of antiquity, which they can only do as imitative artists. Not as men who model their lives on antiquity?

7[3] Origin of classical philology. (Did the ancient world require a class of professional advocates?)

Modern origin of the philologist.

Their relationship to the Greeks.

Their influence on non-philologists.

The philologues of the future—will there be any?

7[4] Goddess Friendship, graciously
 heed the song we sing to friendship now!
 Wherever eyes of friendship gaze,

there the joy of friendship lives.
 Come to us, gracious goddess,
 dawn in your eyes and in your holy hand
 the unfailing pledge of ever-living youth!

7[5] In reviewing the history of philology, it is striking how few really gifted men have taken part in it. Among the most famous are several who ruined their minds with encyclopedic learning, and among the most intelligent of these were some who could only exercise their intellect on minutiae. It is a sad story. In my opinion no discipline is so poor in talent. It is cripples of the intellect who found their hobbyhorse in verbal quibbling.

I prefer to write something which will be worthy of being read in the way philologists read their texts, rather than squatting over an author. And generally speaking—even the most trifling creation is better than talk about creativity.

7[6] Anybody who generally approves of studying the past will find it reasonable, praiseworthy, and above all understandable that there are scholars whose exclusive concern is Greek and Roman antiquity. But that these same scholars should also be the teachers of the nobler youth, is less easily understood. There is a problem here. Why *these* scholars in particular? It is not so self-evident as the case of the professor of medicine who is also a practising physician. Were the cases the same, then the study of Greek and Roman antiquity would be the same as the “discipline of education.” In short, the relationship between theory and practice in the philologist is less readily apparent. How can he claim to be a teacher in the highest sense and to educate not only all professional scholars but in general all civilized men? —Therefore the philologist must borrow this educational power from the ancient world. At this point we ask in astonishment: how did we come to ascribe such value to a distant past that we can become educated only by the aid of its

knowledge? —Actually this question is not asked or only seldom; rather, the authority of philology in education is almost undisputed, and antiquity simply *has* that value. To this extent the philologist's situation is more favorable than that of any other scholar. Admittedly, no very great number of men need him; the doctor, for instance, is much more in demand. But he does have a select following, disciples of an age when everything is burgeoning, who can spend time and money on their own education and fulfillment. Wherever European culture now extends, secondary schools have been founded on Latin and Greek as the chief and highest means of education. As a result classical studies have found the ideal opportunity for propagating themselves and arousing respect: in this regard, no other discipline is so favored. As a rule all those who have gone through such institutions insist on the excellence of the system; they are unconscious conspirators on behalf of classical philology. Let someone who has gone a different route say a word to the contrary, and the ensuing silence is so unanimous one would think education were some sort of magic which blessed its adepts and identified them by means of the bliss they felt. There is no argument offered at all, merely "Our experience proves it."

Now there are many things which men are so used to doing that they consider them practical. For familiarity adds a sweetness to everything, and men for the most part judge the value of something in terms of their own pleasure. *The pleasure in classical antiquity*, as that pleasure is now experienced, should be examined and analyzed to discover how much of it is pleasure in familiarity, and how much is pleasure in unfamiliarity—by which I mean that inward, active, new, and fresh pleasure of the sort daily awakened by creative conviction, pleasure in a higher purpose, pleasure which also wills the means to that purpose, so that one advances step by step from one unfamiliar thing to another, like a mountain climber.

What is the basis of the great value assigned to antiquity in the modern world, that all modern culture should be built upon it? Where did this fancy originate, this preference for antiquity?

In this study I think I have recognized that the whole of classical philology—I mean its whole modern existence and power—rests on the same basis as antiquity's reputation as an important educational device. Philology as education is the precise expression of a dominant view of the value of antiquity and the best method of education. In this idea two principles are contained. First, all higher education must be historical education; second, Greek and Roman history differ from all other history because they are classical history. Thus the student of classical history becomes the educator. We will not here look into the first proposition, whether higher education must be historical, but the second: *why classical education?*

On this matter there are several widespread prejudices.

First, the prejudice contained in the synonymous expression, "the humanities." Antiquity is classical because it is the school of humanism.

Second, "Antiquity is classical because it is *enlightened*."

7[7]

Il faut dire la vérité et s'immoler.
(Voltaire)

Let us suppose that there were freer and superior spirits who were dissatisfied with the education now in fashion, and that they arraigned it before their court. How would the defendant answer the charge? Surely along these lines: "Whether or not you have the right to arraign me, in any case do not look to me, but to the educators who molded me. It is their duty to defend me and mine to keep silence: I am only what they have made me." The educators now would be haled before the court, and conspicuous among them would be a whole profession, that is, the *philologists*. This profession consists, first, of men who use their knowledge of Greek and Roman antiquity to educate youngsters between the ages of thirteen and twenty; and, second, of those whose task it is to educate an ever fresh supply of these teachers—that is, to be educators of educators. The philologists in the first group are teachers in public schools; those in the second are university professors. To the care of the former are

entrusted chosen youngsters in whom talent and superior intelligence are sometimes visible, and whose parents can afford to spend considerable time and money upon their education; if the other students who lack these three conditions present themselves, the teacher has the right to refuse them. The second group, consisting of classicists at the universities, accepts those young men who feel committed to the noblest and most demanding of professions, that of teacher and moulder of the human race; and they too have the right to reject unqualified intruders.

And so, if we condemn the education of an age, the philologists are vulnerable to very harsh criticism. For either they desire precisely this bad education in the wrong-headed conviction that it is really good; or they do not want it, but are too feeble to establish the education they regard as better. Their offense therefore lies either in their lack of judgment or in the weakness of their will. In the first case they might plead that they knew no better; in the second, that they could do no better. But since these philologists educate primarily through the help of Greek and Roman antiquity, then their presumed lack of judgment would be visible in two things: first, in their misunderstanding of the ancient world; and second, because antiquity is presented to the modern world on the pretext that it is the most important educational tool, whereas antiquity does not educate at all or no longer does so today. On the other hand, if they are rebuked for their weakness of will, they would be justified in ascribing educational significance and power to antiquity, but they themselves would not be the best means of making antiquity express this power. That is, they would have no authority as teachers, and their posture in life would be false. But how did they get themselves into this predicament? Through a delusion about themselves and their vocation. In order, therefore, to assign the philologist his share of responsibility for the bad state of modern culture, we might sum up the various possibilities in this statement: *If the philologist wants to prove his innocence, he must understand three things: antiquity, the present, and himself. His offense lies in*

the fact that he understands neither antiquity, nor the present, nor himself. First question: does the philologist understand the ancient world?—

[8 === U 1 6b. Summer, 1875.]

8[1] *Books for 8 years:*
 Schopenhauer
 Dühring
 Aristotle
 Goethe
 Plato

8[2] Against lyric poetry among the Germans. I read here that Mörike (!) must be regarded as the greatest of German lyric poets! Isn't stupidity a crime, as here, where the critics do *not* perceive, or even want to perceive, Goethe, as the greatest? —What in the world goes on in their minds? What sort of notion of lyric do they have? So I take a fresh look at this Mörike and, apart from a few things in the manner of the German folksong, I find him feeble and unpoetic. Above all he is utterly lacking in clarity of intuition. And what is called his musical quality is also rather slight (and shows how little people know of music, which is *more* than this sort of insipidly sweet tra-la-la and singsong!). —He has no ideas at all, and I can only tolerate poets who, like Pindar and Leopardi, can also think. In the long run what is the value of such childish vagueness of feeling, as expressed in German folksong? In this regard I much prefer Horace, even though he is very definite and pieces words and ideas together as in a mosaic.

8[3] *In order:*
 Dühring, *The Value of Life*
 Dühring, *Course of Philosophy*
 Reis, *Mathematics*
 physics, etc.

Library of Natural Sciences
political economy
hygiene
history

Devote the first hours of the day to learning.

Then work on lectures.

In seminar: *Prometheus?*

Choephoroe?

Alcestis?

8[4] *Plans of all kinds:*

1) a series of lectures on the nature of the Greeks.

2) collection of a vast empirical stock of human knowledge. For this read many older historical works, novels, etc. Also letters.

3) Dühring, as the effort to get past Schopenhauer; to make a thorough study and see what Schopenhauer holds, or doesn't hold for me.

4) gradual continuation of my Unmodern Meditations. First, "Richard Wagner in Bayreuth," "We Philologists," "On Religion."

5) to finish my philological works, so that I don't completely forget them. To publish the first volume of a collection of philological works containing: "The *Choephoroe* of Aeschylus," "On Rhythm," "The Contest between Hesiod and Homer," "*Diadoche* of the Philosophers."

6) preliminary studies for a theory of style, with my students Baumgartner and Brenner.

7) In the upper school: Plato, *Iliad*, theory of modes, Aeschylus' *Agamemnon*.

8[5] Goethe is primarily an *epic*, much more than a lyric poet. Utterly wrong to see in him the *greatest* of lyric poets.

8[6] Like all poets, Aeschylus is unreligious.

8[7] *Don Quixote* is one of the most destructive books.

8[8] Nature does not need “good weather” in order to look beautiful. Some natures *require* bad weather in order to be beautiful.

APPENDIX

[4 === N I 3b. Spring, 1875.]

4[1] *Agenda:*

BOOKS to be bought and exchanged.

Historians, e.g. all of Ranke.

Geographers, e.g. Peschel's Atlas.

Biographers, e.g. Cardanus.

Patristic writers in translation.

Bible in modern translation.

Graeco-Roman classics, e.g. Aristotle.

Schopenhauer.

Library of *natural sciences*.

4[2] To be excerpted: “The Population of the Alps” by Rüttimeyer, in *Jahrbuch des Schweizer Alpenclubs*. First year, 1864.

Later: *From the Sea to the Alps*, by L. Rüttimeyer, Bern, 1854. Dalpsche Bookstore.

4[3] *To Autumn*, 1876

Summer, 1875. “Philology.”

Autumn till Christmas. Preparatory studies for “Wagner.”

Summer, 1875. History of Literature.

Winter, 1875-6. *Choephoroë*, with critical text and interpretation.

Summer, 1876 ————

Work on Burckhardt notebook.

4[4] *Difficulty in Producing the Artist*

- 1) Lack of naïveté in education—limited concept of Nature.
- 2) Where will the artist find a place for himself? Music a language that can be understood only in opposition to the rest of the culture. Restlessness of the artist in official posts.
- 3) How can he protect himself from misunderstanding? If he writes, who is his audience?
- 4) He takes play seriously (Cervantes, chivalric romances; Wagner, the theater); the pathos seems wasted, unless it serves as a summons and symbol for strengths of the same sort.
- 5) He cleaves to existence with more pleasure than other men.
- 6) A modern artist must have *intentions*.

4[5] *School of Educators*

Where is:

the doctor
the scientist
the economist
the cultural historian
the scholar of ecclesiastical history
the Hellenist
the political scientist